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Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351
John J. Browder, ISB #7531
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-4300
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344
2700.02A\2nd Aff Counsei MSJ.wpd

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,

Case No. CVl0-3993
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS
MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS' OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
: SS.

County of Ada

)

I, Michael E. Kelly, having been first duly sworn upon oath, do hereby depose and state under
penalty of perjury:
I.

That I am one of the attorneys for Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals in the

above-captioned case and make this Affidavit of my own personal knowledge;
2.

That attached as Exhibit A to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of pp. 37-44 and Exhibits

C & E of the transcript of the deposition of Wade Massey, dated 05117/11.
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-I

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this

2:.3_ day of January, 2012.
Michael E. Kelly

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me a notary public this

2~y

of January, 2012.

' Public-fi
Notary
Residing at:__.__,_'-"'\;..,"-1'-"-~,.__,~=-..---,--:;--
M y Commission Expires:_--=~t:;F---t--\:b''--

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-2

01.69

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 0_ day of January, 2012, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated
below, addressed as follows:
Jeffrey M. Wilson
WILSON & MCCOLL
420 W. Washington
PO Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-9100
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442
Attorney for Plaintiff

~

Patrick J. Collins
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC
700 17th St., Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 296-7700
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160
Attorney for Plaintiff

~

0

0

0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-3

01.70
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Page 39

.51

specific other than "Therf
t of mistakes."
1
I thi1Lk the one that he ~id mention was
2
that it was Parma, it says Parma versus Caldwell. 3
But that was probably what set him to make the 4
~ll.

5

Q. Back to page 11 in Exhibit B, and I'm
in the column of "Comparable No. 4." It's 3703
N. Highway 16.
A. Um-hmm.
Q. About ten iines down under the row for
0 ~ 0 '~ an a,.:i~,,~,_.,,,.,,,.,..,._ ,..r 4° son
"c~'-e" '-h \.t!.\.t
no Yv"11v. ,_
see that?
A.Ida.
Q. And the site was 10 acres, just to the
left of that. What does the 49,800 represent?
A. If these numbers are correct, which I
don't know if they are, that would be a
$10,000-an-acre adjustment.
Q. And why would you make that adjustme
A. Because the 10 acres is larger than the
subject of 5.02. So since it's superior, you
would take away $49,800, based on a
$10,000-an-acre adjustment for contributory val
when comparing the two.
Q. And is that to bring the

6

U1l

l

l)

..l

U.JUi:>Ll.1-1\,..d..U . VJ.. -

./'

7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14

15
16

17
18

W
20
21

22
24

A. You're trying to make them apples to
1
apples, yes.
2
Q. And so an adjustment to bring the
3
acreages very close in size?
4
A. Well, yes. You're trying to take away
5
monetary value to make it smaller.
6
Q. Do you know the physical layout of
7
comparable property No. 4, a comparable sale? 8
A. Meaning, the lay of the land?
9
Q. The lay of the land, yeah. What would 10
cause those extra 5 acres to be worth only
11
$10,000 an acre?
12
A. I don't know the lay of the land, as we
13
sit here. Again, if those numbers were -- my
14
intention, which I don't know if they were, if
15
they were -- excess land in Eagle, if that was in 16
Eagle, also had a contributory value of $10,000 17
an acre, which is high -- it's considered on the 18
high side -- for adjustment value in this area.
19
Since I saw Valerie Hruza's 5 acres as
20
superior to its immediate surroundings because i 1
was up on a hill, that was my justification for
22
-- or would have been my justification, in my 23
mind, for using an Eagle property that -- you
24
know, flat land in Eagle is valued with a
25

(208)345-9611

ue of 10 grand an acre.
contributo
V rnu 1-nr>•XT CllnPr1r>r 111"
L-&.l-1 r>n a h1"ll nr1th
360-degree views is as close as I could see to
becoming an equal comparable valuewise, if that
makes sense, in Caldwell.
Q. Okay, we're going to move on.
Mr. Massey, I hand you what has been
marked as Deposition Exhibit C. Can you identify
that?
A. This is a check written to my company
from Idahy Federal Credit Union.
Q. Do you know what it was for?
A. I do now. I didn't at that time.
Evidently, I'm told it was meant to pay for this
appraisal.
Q. And Capitol West negotiated the check?
A. Can you describe the word "negotiated"?
Q. Cashed, deposited the check in its bank
account.
A. My sister, who is an independent
contractor for me, did, yes.
Q. And is she the one who put the stamp on
the back of the check and deposited that?
A. Yes.
.L

'-J'

..l.lt...L..l.'-J

Vv'

U\..J..t-'V..l...LV.L'

V.J..J..

.l...L

-L...L

VV .LLLI.
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A. Shannon Polfer, P-o-1-f-e-r. And
actually -- no, yeah, she did. It was her. I
had another employee that worked for me around
this time that did my books, but she left. It is
my sister that did deposit this.
Q. I'm going to hand you what has been
marked as Exhibit D. I'll ask if you can
identify this?
A. It looks like the boundaries that were
described in this defective report describing the
neighborhood boundaries for the subject prope1iy,
which is incorrect.
Q. Okay. I drew that, and that's what I
intended it to represent, so thank you.
A. Um-hmm.
Q. Mr. Massey, I hand you what has been
marked as Deposition Exhibit E, and ask if you
can identify that?
A. I've never seen this document before in
my life.
Q. What does it appear to be?
A. It appears to be a Settlement -- I'm
guessing for the -- no, I don't know. Is this
the loan that she got -- or I mean the Settlement
Statement for the loan that Ms. Hruza got from

M & M COURT REPORTING

(208)345-8800 (fax)
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1
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4
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18
19
20
21
22

23
24

Idahy? I don't know.
1
Q. Who's the borrower over in the upper
2
left-hand comer there?
3
A. Valerie Hruza.
4
Q. And the identity of the lender?
5
A. Idahy Federal Credit Union.
6
Q. And the property location?
7
A. 16462 Plum Road, in Caldwell.
8
Q. And that's the subject property?
9
A. I believe it is.
10
Q. Yeah, that we've been talking about?
11
A. Yes. Itlookslikeitis.
12
Q. And then what's the settlement date?
13
A. 9/13/07.
14
Q. And that is approximately how long
15
after the effective date of your appraisal?
16
A. Roughly three months, I believe.
17
Q. And approximately how long after the
18
date you signed the appraisal?
19
A. Eight months, I think. Well, I would
20
21
have signed it the day I sent it. But, again,
that particular field is a dynamic field. So I
22
don't know if that's even the correct date it was 23
signed, because that is one of the dynamic fields 24

where, if you look at the
intersection of Homedale Road and Plum Road, I
believe it was south of, but I don't recall.
Q. And if you could refer back to
Exhibit D, that's the -- the boundaries of the
neighborhood is described in the report?
A. Exhibit D is, yes. I believe that
outlines the incorrect boundaries.
Q. Right. Could you reproduce that on
Exhibit F?
A. Circling it?
Q. Or draw it kind of in the shape it is.
A. (Witness complied.) Okay.
Q. I'm going to hand you now what has been
marked as Exhibit G. Can you identify Exhibit G
A. This looks like a copy of Scope of Work
for the appraisal.
Q. And the "CWA" number up on the top?
A. 1932.
Q. Does that confirm it's the scope of
work for this?
A. I believe it is, yeah.
Q. Do you recognize whose writing it is
that appears on Exhibit G?
Page 44
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5
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it throws arbitrary numbers in there.
1
Q. Let's look at Exhibit B again, and see
2
3
what it says on the date that you signed it.
A. It says July 20, 2007. So if that
4
number was correct it would be within two months 5
Q. I direct your attention to under
6
"Settlement Charges" about the fourth line down, 7
No. 803, "Appraisal fee"?
8
A. Okay.
9
Q. "Capitol West, $800"?
10
A. Okay.
11
Q. Is that represented by Exhibit C, which
12
was the check?
13
A. I would say the numbers match. What
14
15
their intention was, I don't know, but I'm
16
assummg.
Q. Mr. Massey, I hand you what has been
17
marked as Exhibit F. What I'd like you to do on 18
this, if you could, is mark approximately where
19
the subject property is on this exhibit.
20
A. Here's Plum Road, I can see that. I
21
22
don't recall if it's south of Homedale Road or
23
north ofHomedaJe Road.
Q. But it's in the neighborhood?
24
A. I'm guessing. I'm going to circle
25

(208)345-9611

Q. Do you recognize whose signature that

is?
A. No.
Q. What date appears?
A. 9/13/07.
Q. How does that date compare to the date
on Exhibit E?
A. How? Oh, I believe that was the
settlement date.
Q. Which is the settlement statement,
yeah.
A. Okay, yeah. I believe that was the
settlement date shown in that.
Q. And the two dates match?
A. They do appear to match. Can I ask
you, what does that say? To me it's not legible.
Do you know?
Q. I'll tell you what I think it is just
to help you with your interpretation. "Okay to
use appraisal one time."
A. Who is that signature?
Q. I don't know. That's why I was asking
you.
A. Oh, you know it might be -- I think
it's the vice president.
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Name & Address of Borrower:

Name & Address of lender :

VALARlE HRUZA
16462 PLUM RO
CALDWELL, 10 83607

1 010 ROSE STREET
BOISE, ID 83703-5739

I DAHY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION

Property Loca rion (it di erent from above):
16462 PLUM RO
CALDWELL, ID

ettlernent Agent:

DAN BA~GER

83607

Place of Settlement:

.

I'
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l'\111
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' ... u

Loan Number:

Settlement Date:

001

9/13/2007

L.

M.

Settlement Charges (Items marked "P.O.C ." were paid outsidfr closin g.)

Disbursement to Others

800. Items Payable in Connection with loan
802.
803.
804.
805 .
806.
807.
808.
809.
810.
811.
900.
90 1.
902.

$

% to
% to

801. Loan origination fee

""aoo.oo
...."

l o an di scoum
Appraisal tee to
CAPITOL WEST APPRAISALS
Credit report. to
Inspection tee to
Mortgaoe insurance application fee to
Mortgage broker fee to

1501.BANK OF AMERICA

$101,904.99

1502

$7662.00

-BENEFICIAL

1503.BANK Of AMERICA

$26 380.00

£.t
f-!
d.\ F"

1504.IJELLS FARGO

$18,589.00

i'.:'

1505.

$

1506.

$

1507.

$

$

1508.

$

$

1509.

$

1510.

$

1511.

$

"'
::;>

1512.

$

"'

1513.

$

""

1514.

$

1515.

$

"'

;;

•

:;>
9

FLOOD FEE

17.00

9

·- Items Required by lender to be Paid In Advance
@$
Interest From
per day
to
Mortgage Insurance premium for
months to

90 3. Hazard in surance premi um for
904.
1000.
1001.
1002.
1003.
1004.
1005.
1006.
1007 .
1008.
1100.
1101.
1102.
1103.
1104.
1105.
1106.

year(s) to

Reserves Deposited with lender
Hazard insurance
months@$
Mortqage insurance
months@$
City property taxes
months@$
County property ta xes
months@ $
Annual assessments
months@ $
months@$
months@ $
mont hs@$
Title Charges
Settlement or closing fee to
Abstract or title search to
Title examination to
Title insurance binder to
Document preparation to
Notary fees to

1107. Attorney's fees to
(includes above item numbers)
1108. Tit le insurance toPlONEER TITLE COMPANY
(i ncludes above item numbers)
1109. Lender's Coverage
1110. Owner' s Coverage
1111.
1112.
11 13.

$
$

"'

"'

"'

per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per

month
month
month
month
month
month
month
month

l

.,.

"'
::j

~

"'
"'
"'
:;-.

1520.

TOTAL DISBURSED
{ent er on line 1603} $154,535.99

"'

"'
$

f:

$225.00
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1200.
1201.
1202.
1203.
1204.
1205.
1300.

Government Recording and Transfer Charges
Recording fees
City/county tax/stamps
State tax/stamps

Additional Settlement Charges

1301 . Survey to

1302. Pest inspection to
1303. Architectural/engineering services to
1304. Building permit to
1305.
1306.
1307.
1400. Total Settlement Charges (enter on line 1602)

s21.oo
s

N.

NET SETTLEMENT

1600. Loan Amount

$

$

1601. Plus Cash/Check from
Borrower

$

s

1602. Minus Total Settlement
Charges (iine 1400i

$1063.00

$

s

s

s
s
s
s
s
$1063.00

250,000.00

1603. Minus Total Disbursements
to Others (line 15201
$154,535.99
1604. Equals Disbursements
to Borrower (after
$94,401.01
expiration of any
applicable rescission
period required by !awl

\

form HUD-1A 12194! ref. RESPA
E.ST226 !LASER)
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Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351
John J. Browder, ISB #7531
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413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, ID 83701-0856
Telephone: (208) 342-4300
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344
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Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
Case No. CVlO - 3993

CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND
CAPITOL WEST'S REPLY TO
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

VS.

WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

By and through undersigned counsel, Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals
(sometimes hereinafter "Defendants" or "Massey") file their Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants
Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement
(the "Reply"). This Reply is supported by the pleadings, papers and affidavits filed in this lawsuit.

I.

INTRODUCTION
Massey moved for summary judgment on each of the Plaintiff's three causes of action: (1)

DEFENDANTS MAS SEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- I
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negligence; (2) negligent misrepresentation; and (3) breach of contract. First, the legal basis for Massey's
Motion for Summary Judgment on the negligence cause of action is that Massey did not owe Idahy any
duty upon which to predicate that claim. Second, the gravamen of all of the Plaintiff's causes of action
is negligent misrepresentation, which Idaho does not recognize except against accountants. And third, the
breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law because, in addition to being a reconstituted negligent
misrepresentation count, there is no consideration, and, hence, no contract or privity between the Plaintiff
and Massey. Alternatively, even if there is a contract, the Plaintiff is alleging a breach of the standard of
care, and not a breach of an independent contractual duty.
The Plaintiff, in turn, does not raise a question of material fact sufficient to defeat Massey's Motion
for Summary Judgment. Notably, the Plaintiff does not dispute that Idaho does not recognize negligent
misrepresentation against appraisers, or argue for a good faith extension of the law. Nor does the Plaintiff
seriously contest Massey's argument that the gravamen of the breach of contract claim is professional
negligence. That leaves the professional negligence claim.
The professional negligence cause of action fails as a matter of law for at least two reasons. First,
although it is nominally titled "professional negligence," properly characterized it is a negligent
misrepresentation cause of action, which, again, Idaho only recognizes against accountants. Second, the
Plaintiff maintain<> that Massey should be held liable to Idahy despite the existence of the following
undisputed facts that compel the conclusion that Massey did not owe a duty to Idahy:
Idahy was not the Intended User of Massey's appraisal.
•

Idahy was not a Client of Massey .

•

There was no appraiser/client relationship between Massey and Idahy .

•

Massey has never spoken with anybody at Idahy and did not know Idahy had received a

DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
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copy of the appraisal until after the borrowers, the Hruzas, already had defaulted.
Idahy does not even know how it obtained Massey's appraisal.
As between Massey and his Client/Intended User, Clearwater Mortgage, Inc., the appraisal
was an incomplete or inchoate work product that was not be relied upon.
Idahy's position lacks merit as a matter of law. It reduces to the absurd proposition that an
appraiser owes a tort duty to an undefined and potentially limitless class of third-party non-clients simply
because they improperly obtained a report that was intended for another, and which was undeniably
rescinded by the parties who contemplated it. There is no support for this argument in law and fact and,
accordingly, the Court should reject it and grant summary judgment in favor of Massey on all of the
Plaintiff's causes of action.

A.

Because Massey Did Not Owe Idahy a Duty, Plaintiff's Negligence Claim Fails As a
Matter of Law. 1

The Plaintiff's reliance on the three paragraphs contained in the appraisal report, and which are
excerpted on page 3 of Plaintiff's Response, is unavailing. The first merely states what Joe Huffman made
clear in his affidavit: that an appraisal is for the Client or Intended User to evaluate a property. Idahy was
neither a Client nor an Intended User. See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at <JJ:<l[ 7-9. The second paragraph is
irrelevant to the issue of whether a duty to Idahy exists because it only states that the report may be
disclosed to another lender at the borrower's request. Here, however, there is no evidence the Hruzas
requested that the report be transmitted to Idahy, which, in any event, does not know how it obtained the
appraisal. Furthermore, reliance on work product of an appraiser selected by the borrower is improper
under USP AP and federal guidelines regulating credit unions. Exh. B, 21, Aff. of Counsel & Affidavit

1

Massey incorporates by reference hereto the analyses regarding its argument that Massey
did not owe Idahy any tort duty that are contained in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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of Joe Huffman,~[ 14. But more importantly, it is irrelevant because by itself, distribution of the appraisal
to Idahy would not create the appraiser-client relationship, as it is the engagement for an appraisal
Assignment that creates that relationship. See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at U 9, 10 & 12.
The third paragraph suffers a similar fate. Once again, there is no evidence the borrowers requested
Idahy to rely on the appraisal, as Idahy does not know how it received it. But even if they had, it would
not create the appraiser-client relationship, which again, only springs from engagement for an appraisal
Assignment. See id. Moreover, the Plaintiff ignores what are two of the most important undisputed facts
of this case: ( l) the Client, which was Clearwater Mortgage, Inc., and Massey, undisputedly, rescinded the
Agreement for appraisal services; and (2) Idahy failed to comply with industry practice by obtaining a letter
of assignment transferring the appraisal from Clearwater Mortgage, Inc. to Idahy. See Affidavit of Ernie
Menchaca, at ~m 8, 9 & Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at 19.
Another flaw with the Plaintiff's analysis of this issue is that it renders meaningless the appraiserclient relationship as defined by USP AP. Under Plaintiff's view, anybody who obtains and uses a copy
of the appraisal is owed a tort duty. This is true even if the appraiser never speaks to the recipient, which
is the situation here, and does not know for what purpose the appraisal was used, or the identity of the
recipient lender.
These are not a irrelevant or theoretical considerations. Like any professional, an appraiser would
want to know the identity of his or her client. Does the lender have a reputation for rigorous underwriting?
Does it pay its bills? Is it overzealously litigious? These questions and many more could play into an
appraiser's decision to enter into an appraiser-client relationship and, if it does, the terms and conditions
of that relationship. Under the Plaintiff's theory, the appraiser is deprived of answers to all of these
questions. Instead, the appraisal is a talisman that can be passed from individual to individual, or company

DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
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to company, granting negligence and breach of contract causes of action to anybody who uses it to make
bad loans.
Additionally, contrary to Plaintiff's position, the $800 check it sent is irrelevant to whether Massey
owed Idahy a tort duty. The check was cut and cashed by the Defendant's bookkeeper after the close of
escrow. And the check does not state to which property it pertains. Regardless, it is the "engagement for
an 'Assignment,' not payment ... that creates the appraiser-client relationship." See Affidavit of Joe
Huffman,

at~[

10.

Nor does the check establish privity because it is not consideration. "To constitute consideration,
a performance or a return promise must be bargained for. A performance or return promise is bargained
for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange
for that promise." See Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 780, 215 P.3d 494 (2009),
quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981 ). Here, there was no bargained for exchange
between Massey and Idahy. They undisputedly never spoke with one another, and the $800 check was cut
several months after Massey and Clearwater, Mortgage, Inc. rescinded the Agreement for appraisal
services. As such, there is no consideration, no privity, no contract and no tort duty. 2

B.

The Plaintiff Misinterprets Case Law Upon Which Massey is Relying.

Instead of marshaling case law standing for the proposition that an appraiser owes a tort duty to
an undefined class of third-party non-clients with whom the appraiser has never spoken and has no

2

The Plaintiff misrepresents the record of the alleged colloquy between attorney Shild
and Connie Miller regarding the $800 check. The Plaintiff reports on pages 4 and 5 that when
Miller asked Shild why Massey accepted the check, attorney Shild stated that he did not want to
comment about the payment. This is exactly opposite of what happened according Ms. Miller's
notes, which are Exhibit G to the 30(b)(6) deposition of the Plaintiff. Namely, it was Ms. Miller
who said she did not want to comment about the $800 payment in response to Mr. Shild' s
question whether Idahy wanted the $800 back. Regardless, it is irrelevant to the issue of whether
Massey owed Idahy a tort duty, or if there was a contract between the two.
DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
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Agreement, the Plaintiff tries to distinguish the case law that clearly supports Massey's position. Or in the
case of Christiansen v. Roddy, 186 Cal.App.3d 780 (1986), the Plaintiff ignores the case law completely.
It is clear however, the case law discussed by the parties favors the Defendant's analysis of this case.

The Plaintiff's failure to address Christiansen v. Roddy is especially telling. In that case, a
California appellate court held that an appraiser did not owe a duty of care to a class of investors because
the appraiser did not perform the appraisal for the investors, but for an individual who matched investors
with loans. See id., at 783. Furthermore, the appraiser did not know the investors, and was not aware until
after a claim was made that they were considering loaning money secured by the appraiser property. See

id., at 787.
The same analysis applies in this case. It is undisputed that Massey performed the appraisal for
Clearwater Mortgage, Inc. It also is undisputed that Massey and Clearwater Mortgage, Inc. rescinded the
Agreement for appraisal services. Moreover, as in Roddy, Massey did not know Idahy, and was not aware
until after it made a claim that Idahy purportedly relied upon it. Roddy suggests Massey did not owe the
Plaintiff a tort duty.
In addition, Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish Decatur Ventures, LLC v. Daniel, 485 F.3d 387, 390
(7th

Cir. 2007) falls flat. As the excerpt on page 10 of the Plaintiff's Response clearly states, Indiana3

limits a professional' s liability to the client and any "third party who the professional knows will see and
rely upon" it. Receipt of the professional' s opinion is insufficient. The court confidently added that,
although Indiana could change its law, the court doubted it would do so "by treating people the
professional has never heard of, and who are not the professional's clients, as third-party beneficiaries of
a contract between the Professional and the actual client." See, id. Under that test, Massey cannot be

3

The Federal Circuit Court was applying Indiana law.
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liable because Idahy was his Client and Massey did not know Idahy, or any lender for that matter, would
rely on an inchoate and rescinded appraisal.
Similarly, the Plaintiff's excerpt of another case Massey relied on, is unavailing. Huntington

Mortgage Company v. Mortgage Power and Financial Services, Inc., 90 F.Supp.2d 670, 673 (D. Md.
2000). The excerpt states that, absent privity, appraisers do not owe a duty in negligence for purely
economic loss. But that is the situation in this case. There is no contract or privity between Massey and
Idahy. 4 As such, under the reasoning of Huntington Mortgage, Massey did not owe Idahy a duty of care.
Likewise, the contention that Emmons v. Brown, 600 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) supports the
Plaintiff is incorrect. In that case, the Court held that an appraiser who was not in privity with borrowers
and lacked "actual knowledge" the borrowers would rely on the appraisal, "owed no duty of care." Again,
that is the situation here. There is no contract or privity between Massey and Idahy; as such, Massey does
not owe Idahy a duty of care under the principles enunciated in Emmons v. Brown.

III.
CONCLUSION
The undisputed facts establish that as a matter of law the Plaintiff is not entitled to recovery from
Massey. The negligent misrepresentation claim fails because Idaho does not recognize it. The breach of
contract claim fails because: ( 1) there is no contract between the parties; (2) there is no alleged breach of
an independent contractual obligation; and (3) in any case, the gist of the breach of contract claim is
negligent misrepresentation. And finally, the negligence claim fails for two reasons. First, like the
contract claim, the negligence cause of action is properly characterized as negligent misrepresentation.

4

Huntington also is notable because the cause of action at issue was negligent
misrepresentation. This adds credence to Massey's argument that Plaintiff's claims all are
properly characterized as negligent misrepresentation.
DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
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Second, under the facts of this case, Massey did not owe a duty of care to Idahy, which was not his Client
nor an Intended User of the rescinded appraisal.
For the reasons set forth above and in the record, the Defendants respectfully request that the Court
grant summary judgment in their favor and dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.
DATED this

2'1

day of January, 2012.
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC

By: ~~~~~-r-~~~~~~
Michael E.. K ly, Of the Firm
Attorneys for the Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

f

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this '2.
day of January, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated below,
addressed as follows:
Jeffrey M. Wilson
WILSON & MCCOLL
420 W. Washington
PO Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-9100
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442
Attorney for Plaintiff
Patrick J. Collins
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC
700 17th St., Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 296-7700
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160
Attorney for Plaintiff

g
0
D

~
0
D

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

Michael E. ijlny
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Jeffrey M. Wilson, 615
Wilson & McColl
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200
Boise, ID 83703
Telephone: 208~345-9100

Patrick J. Collins, #13046
Collins & Coldwell, LLC
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: 303-296-7700
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTPJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT ·
OF TIIE STATE OF IDA.BO, IN AND FOR IBE COUNTY OF CANYON

CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY,
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. CVl0-3993
WADE MASSEY

CAPITOL \VEST

APPRAISA.LS,
Defendant~;.

PLAINTffl•''S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS WADE l't!ASSEY AND
CAPITOL WEST APPRAISALS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JlJDGMENT

Plaintift~

by and through its undersigned counsel, reply to Defendants Wade Massey and

Capitol West A.pprai:sals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and states as

follows:

1
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INTRODUCTION

CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc. (hereinafter, "Plaintiff) filed with the Court a Complaint
against Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisers (hereinafter, 11Defendantsn or
"Massey") asse111ng claims for professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach
of contract. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a Motion and Memorandum in Support of Summary
Judgment. Plaintiff now submits its Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiff inCOJT)Orates by reference the legal standard set forth m its Motion and
Memorandwn in Support of Su..111mary Judgment.

Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment argues that
Massey's Appraisal was prepared exclusively for Clearwater Mortgage and that Idahy Federal
Credit Union, n/k/a Icon Federal Credit Union (hereinafterj "Idahy FCU") was not a 1'client'' of
Defendants nor an "intended user" of the Appraisal as defined by the Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice (hereinafter, "USPAP"). Based on thls argument, Defendants
assert that they did not owe a duty to Plaintiff and cannot be held liable for negligence.

Defendants also assert that Defendants did not prepare a "Report" as defined by USPAP "that

2
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could serve as a basis for breach" in tort or contract1. However, there is no legitimate legal or

factual basis for either of Defendants' arguments.

A.

Per the language of the Uniform Residential Appraisal Report and USPAP,

Defendants owed a duty to Icon as an "intended user" of the Appraisal
The "Appraisal and Report Identification", which is signed by Massey and accompanies
Defendants' Uniform Residential Appraisal Report (hereinafter, "Appraisari) lists three types of
appraisals: a "self contained" appraisal; a "summary" appraisal; and a "restricted use" appraisal.
Each type of appraisal contains a box next to the title. Notably, Defendants' Appraisal has a

check next to the box labeled "summary1' clearly meaning that the Appraisal could be used and
relied upon by Idahy FClT2.
USPAP Standard 2-2(c), requires that a "specific use" state a promii.1ent restriction that

limits use of the report to a specified client and warns that the appraisers opinions and
conclusions .set forth in the report may not be understood properly without additional information
in the appraisers work fiie. However, in this case, Defendants did not define the Appraisal as a
"restricted use" appraisal but rather as a ''summary" appraisal under USP AP Standard 2-2(b).
Standard 2-2(b) requires only that an appraiser state the identity of the client or any intended user
by name or type.
In light of the fact that the Appraisal was identified by Defendants' as a
4

'summarl' appraisal, Paragraph 23 provides:

1

See, Defendant~ Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,

fg. 2.

Defendants' Unified Residential Appraisal Report is attached to Plaintiffs' Motion and Memorandum in Support of
Summary Judgment.
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"THE BORROWER, ANOTHER LENDER AT THE REQUEST OF THE
BORROWER, THE MORTGAGEE OR ITS SUCCESSORS OR
ASSIGNS ... MAY RELY ON THIS APPRAISAL REPORT AS PART OF
ANY MORTGAGE FINANCE TRANSACTION THAT INVOLVES ANY
ONE OR MORE OF THESE PARTIES."

In addition; the Appraiser Certification (hereinafter, "Certification") contained in the Appraisal,
states in paragraph 21 that lender/client (Clearwater Mortgage):
"MAY DISCLOSE OR D!STRIBUTE THIS REPORT TO: ... ANOTHER
LENDER AT THE REQUEST OF THE BORROWER; A MORTGAGEE
OR ITS SUCCESSORS OR ASSIGNS ... "

Defendants' identification of an "intended user" of its Appraisal by type is in accordance

with the USPAP definition of "intended user", as follows:
"THE CLIENT AND ANY OTHER PARTY AS IDENTIFIED, BY NAME OR
B~' TYPc, AS USERS OF THE APPRAISAL, APPRAISAL REVIEW, OR
APPRAISAL CONSULTING REPORT BY THE APPRAISER ON THE
BASIS OF COMMUNICATfON WITH THE CLIENT AT THE TIME OF
ASSIGNMENT."

Not only does USPAP, quoted above, allow for an "intended user'' that is identified by
''type", but, significantly, the language of the Appraisal, signed by Massey as "appraiser", clearly
evidences that fact that Defondants agreed to engage Idahy FCU as an ' intended user" of the
4

Appraisal. Defendants' "Appraisal and Report Identification" confirms that an "intended user"
of Defendants' Appraisal may be identified by type. Further, Defendants specified the "type'' of
"intended user" of the Appraisal when they chose to include language in the Appraisal stating
that a lender or mortgagee "may rely on this Appraisal Report as part of any mortgage finance
transaction", Defendants also included language in the Appraiser Certification stating that the
client may "disclose or distribute this report ... at the request of the borrower". All of this
language, taken together, clearly evidences a duty owed by Defendants to ldahy FCU, who,
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under the written terrns of the Appraisal, was entitled to rely on it as the lender of the Hruzas'
mortgage loan.

Defendants breached the duty owed to Idahy FCU as an "intended user" of their

B.

Appraisal
Defendants continue to maintain that the standard of care was not breached because the

Appraisal was not a ''report" that Idahy FCU could rely on when making a mortgage loan to the
Bruzas',

However~

in Defendants' ovm appraisal, Massey certified and agreed that ''another

lender" could rely on the Appraisal in making its mortgage loan to the Bruzas, which was
secured by the subject property in the Appraisal report
Defendants also claim that Idahy FCU was not entitled to rely on the Appraisal because the

Appraisal was "mutually rescinded" by Defendants and Clearvvater Mortgage before completion
of the assigw.11ent and because of this rescission "there was no bargained for consideration"
between Defendants and Icon3• However, the Defendants' Certification on the Appraisal report
it.self directly contradicts that claim.

Further, Defendants' argument ignores the fact the

Defendants accepted a check from Idahy FCU in the amount of $800 made payable to ""Capitol
West Appraisals and A. Wade Massey," as payment for the Appraisal. While the fact that the
credit union sent Defendants' a check in payment of services may not, in and of itself, be
considered bargained for exchange, the Defendants' acceptance and negotiation of the $800
payment from Idahy FCU established the requisite consideration. Defendants' acceptance of
payment for its Appraisal is direct evidence of the Defendants 1 consent to the credit union's use
of and reliance upon the Appraisal report. Tue Defendants' statement that " .. .Idahy improperly
3

See, Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appntlsals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
pg. 5 ft. note 4.
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obtained a copy of the appraisal ... " is not only false but is also preposterous under the
citcumstances4• The Defendants' own words and Certification intended that the Appraisal could

be used and relied on by "another lender at the request of the bo11owet" 5• The Defendants'
arguments to tbe contrary are specious and defy com.1Ilon sense6.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendants Motion

for Summary Judgment and grant Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment based upon
Defendants' admitted preparation of a "defective appraisal".

DATED thi~day of February, 2012.

Respectfully submitted,
COLLINS & COLD\\Z1'L, LLC

44

See, Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
pg. 6.
5
See, Appraisal Certification, paragraph 21.
~See, Defendants Massey and. Capitol West Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,

pg. 6;

00190

11 b

L·

L 1_1

i

L

I~ o.

: ! i IV'

I I 4~

P.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that true and correct copies of the foregoing have been
served this ~ay of February, 2012, on 1he following:
j

I'vfichael E. Kelly, Esq.
John J. Brower, Esq.
Lopez and Kelly, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Ste. 100
P.O. Box 856
Boise, ID 83701-0856
[Via U.S. Afrill
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Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351
John J. Browder, ISB #7531
LOPEZ & KEI JX, PlLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-4300
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344

FEB 0 9 2012
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
S BRITTON, DEPUTY

2700.024\Affid Menchaka MotionforSJ. wpd

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THJRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN A!\1D FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CUMIS INSURA.J.~CE SOCIETY, INC.,

Case No. CVl0-3993
AFFIDAVIT OF ERNIE
MENCHACA

Plaintiff,
vs.
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL \-VEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
:ss
)

I, ERNIE MENCHACA, being first. duly sworn upon oath, do hereby depose and state under
penalty of pe1jury:
L That I was president of Clearwater Mortgage Inc. at all times relevant to the above-refe:enced
case and make this affidavit of my own personal knowledge;
2. That on or about June 13, 2007, Wade Massey performed an appraisal of the
real property located at 16462 Plum Drive, Caldwell, Idaho 83607 for Clearwater Mortgage Inc.;
3. That the subject Appraisal was prepared exclusively for Clearwater Mortgage Inc. to aid
in its decision to extend a loan for Steven and Valarie Hruza;
AFFIDAVIT OF ERJ\fIE MENCHACA-!
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4. That the subject Appraisal was incomplete and in preliminary draft form at all times and at no
time was meant or considered to be a final draft or to be relied upon in Clearwater Mortgage Inc.' s decision
to accept the Hruzas' loan application;
5. That Clearwater Mortgage Inc. declined to extend a loan to the Hruzas for reasons independent

of the subject Appraisal;
6. That because Clearwater Mortgage Inc. dedded to deny the Hruza loan application, Wade
Massey and I agreed that he would forego the payment for services that was due and payable at that
juncture in lieu of completing the subject Appraisal;
7. That Idahy never requested nor was provided a letter of assignment authorizing it to

us·~

or

rely upon the subject Appraisal in its decision to extend a Joan to the Hruzas;
8. That it is neither proper nor customary to assign an appraisal to another underwriter wi thout
a written letter of assignment to authorize use and reliance upon the appraisal so assigned; and

9. Tb at it is the custom of the industry for those in the position of Idaby to use their own appraiser,
obtain a new appraisal, or request a letter of assignment to use an appraisal initiated by a former
underwriter and to not make lending decisions on the basis of an appraisal, even if tbe same be complete,
that is informally submitted by another underwdter.

FURTHER YOUR AFF1ANT SA YETH NAUGHT.

.

. cl.
DATED this ;!%'.day

(!p::o

~/l'?bel'
11.

Notary Public
Residing at:

r Idaho
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FEB 17 2012
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
l SANDOVAL, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CV-2010-3993-C

INTRODUCTION
In this action, Plaintiff asserts claims for professional negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, and breach of contract based upon Defendant's alleged negligence in
preparing an appraisal on certain real property located in Canyon County. Plaintiff alleges that
ldahy Federal Credit Union, now known as Icon Credit Union, relied on the appraisal in
approving a loan to Steven and Valerie Hruza secured by a second mortgage on the property.
Plaintiffs Complaint, filed April 12, 2010, includes the following general allegations:

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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ORIGINAL

1. Plaintiff is a Wisconsin corporation, authorized to do business in Idaho;
2. Defendant Massey is an Idaho-licensed real estate appraiser;
3. Capitol West was Massey's employer, during all periods relevant to the claims asserted;
4. On June 13, 2007, Massey prepared an appraisal ofresidential property located at 16462
Plum Drive, Caldwell, Idaho, for Clearwater Mortgage, Inc.;
5. Massey appraised the property at $1,150,000.00;
6. In September 2007, the Hruzas sought a $250,000.00 loan from Idahy to be secured by a
second mortgage on the property;
7. Relying on Massey's appraisal report, Idahy approved the loan application;
8.

Idahy paid Defendants for the appraisal by check dated September 18, 2007, and
Defendants accepted the check;

9. Bruzas defaulted on the loan;
10. Idahy filed suit against Hruza on June 23, 2008;
11. Hruza filed Chapter 7 on June 22, 2008;
12. Idahy later learned that the assessed value of the property was $448,900;
13. Plaintiff is subrogated to Idahy' s claim against Defendants.
Based on the above alleged facts, Curnis seeks judgment against Defendants for
Professional Negligence (First Claim for Relief), Negligent Misrepresentation (Second Claim
for Relief), and Breach of Contract (Third Claim for Relief).

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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MOTIONS BEFORE THE COURT
By Motion filed November 10, 2011, Defendants seek summary judgment dismissing
the Complaint. Defendants' Motion is supported by a Memorandum, and the Affidavits of
Defendant's Counsel, Wade Massey, and Ernie Menchaca. 1
By Motion filed November 15, 2011, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment
"determining that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and that Plaintiff is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law finding that Defendants violated the standard of care in
preparing and issuing the real estate appraisal that is the basis of Plaintiff's claims against the
Defendants." Plaintiff's Motion is supported by a Memorandum and two Affidavits of counsel.
The motions came before the court for hearing on February 9, 2012. At the hearing, Mr.
John J. Browder appeared on behalf of Defendants in support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment and in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Mr. Jeffrey M.
Wilson appeared on behalf of Plaintiff in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and in
opposition to Defendants' Motion. After considering the affidavits and documentary evidence
submitted on the motion, the arguments of counsel, the file in this matter and the applicable law,
the court makes the following determination on the motions for summary judgment.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
1

In preparing for the hearing on the instant motions, it became clear to the court that Defendants were relying on the
Menchaca Affidavit in support of their Motion. However, the court could not locate that Affidavit in the file and
there was no record of the Affidavit in the Register of Actions. At the hearing, the court confirmed that Plaintiffs
had timely received service of a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with the original motion papers and granted
Defendants leave to file a copy after the hearing. Defendants filed a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit on February 9,
2012.
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and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). In
determining a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe all disputed facts liberally
in favor of the non-moving party, and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party
resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851,
854 (1991).
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. ofIdaho v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho 415, _ ,
234 P.3d 739, 742 (2010). As a general rule, ifreasonable minds could reach different
conclusions on the evidence presented, the court must deny the motion. Id. However, where
the case will be tried without a jury, the district court, as the trier of fact, may draw the most
probable inferences from the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant summary
judgment, despite potentially conflicting inferences from the evidence. Id.
The party moving for summary judgment may satisfy his or her initial burden by
establishing, either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by
reviewing the nonmoving party's evidence, that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove an
element of a claim or defense at trial. McCorkle v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 141
Idaho 550, 554, 112 P.3d 838, 842 (2005). Once the moving party does so, the nonmoving
party must adduce sufficient admissible evidence to support a finding by the trier of fact in the
nonmoving party's favor on such element or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so
under I.R.C.P. 56(f). Id.

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
As previously indicated, Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing all three
claims asserted against them: Professional Negligence (First Claim for Relief), Negligent
Misrepresentation (Second Claim for Relief), and Breach of Contract (Third Claim for Relief).
I. Plaintiff's Negligence Claim

Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief (Professional Negligence) includes the following
allegations:
20. The Defendants had a duty to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members
of the profession commonly possess.
21. The Defendants breached this duty by utilizing comparable sales values ("comps") that
were dissimilar in age and location from the Property to formulate the appraisal.
22. Idahy reasonably relied on the Defendants' appraisal to be an accurate valuation of the
Property and relied on it in granting a $250,000.00 loan to the Hruzas.
Defendants seek summary judgment dismissing this claim on the basis that Plaintiff
cannot establish that Defendants owed any duty to Idahy, as a matter of law.
A. Duty

A party asserting a claim for negligence must prove: (1) a duty, recognized by law,
requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) breach of that duty; (3) a
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and damage/injury to the plaintiff; and (4)
actual loss or damage. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300,
311 (1999).

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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The question of whether a duty exists is one oflaw. Id., 133 Idaho at 400, 987 P.2d at
312.
As a general rule, there is no duty to act to assist or protect another, absent unusual
circumstances which justify imposing such an affirmative responsibility. Id., 133 Idaho at 399,
987 P .2d at 311. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 3 l 4A (1965) provides a non-exclusive list
of relationships giving rise to a duty to protect or assist. Id. (Common carrier-passenger,
innkeeper-guest, landowner- invitees/licensees, one who takes custody of another.). All of
these relationships share the trait that one person has assumed responsibility for another's safety
or has deprived another of his or her normal opportunities for self-protection. Id, 133 Idaho at
401, 987 P.2d at 313. No such relationship exists on the facts of the present case.
A person may create a duty to another to perform an act in a non-negligent manner by
voluntarily undertaking to perform that act, even though the person had no prior duty to perform
the act. Id., 133 Idaho at 400, 987 P.2d at 312; Baccus v. Ameripride Services, Inc., 145 Idaho
346, 350, 179 P.3d 309, 313 (2008). "In such case, the duty is to perform the voluntarilyundertaken act in a non-negligent manner." Baccus, 145 Idaho at 350. "So, '[l]iability for an
assumed duty ... can only come into being to the extent that there is in fact an undertaking."'

Id (quoting Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389, 34 P.3d 1069, 1072-73 (2001)).
Based upon the allegations of the Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Massey assumed a duty
to Idahy by including the following representation in his Appraisal Report:
23.
The borrower, another lender at the request of the borrower, the mortgagee or its
successors and assigns, mortgage insurers, government sponsored enterprises, and other
secondary market participants may rely on this appraisal report as part of any mortgage
finance transaction that involves any one or more of these parties.

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Specifically, according to Paragraph 31 of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
assumed a duty to Idahy as "another lender at the request of the borrower."
In support of their contention that Massey did not assume any duty to Idahy, Defendants
make the following argument:
1. The Massey Appraisal includes a Cover Letter/Scope of Work Defined identifying the
intended user as Clearwater Mortgage and the borrower as the Hruzas.
2. Paragraph 21 of the Appraisal identifies the parties to whom the lender is authorized to
disclose or distribute the appraisal. These parties include "the borrower, another lender at
the request of the borrower" and the rest of the parties identified in Paragraph 23, quoted
above.
3. At Plaintiff's deposition, Connie Miller, who appeared on behalf of Cumis, stated "We
never identified- I'm not aware that we ever identified how we got the appraisal." (Tr.

21, 11. 10-12).
4. In his Affidavit, Mr. Menchaca, identified as the President of Clearwater Mortgage, Inc.
at all times relevant to the claims asserted by Plaintiff, states:
a. Massey prepared the Appraisal at issue "exclusively for Clearwater Mortgage Inc.
to aid in its decision to extend a loan for Steven and Valarie Hruza;"
b. Clearwater decided against extending a loan to the Hruzas "for reasons
independent of the subject Appraisal;"
c. Idahy did not request and was not "provided a letter of assignment authorizing it
to use or rely upon the subject Appraisal in its decision to extend a loan to the
Hruzas;"

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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d. It is "neither proper nor customary to assign an appraisal to another underwriter
without a written letter of assignment to authorize use and reliance on the
appraisal so assigned;"
e. It is "the custom of the industry for those in the position of Idahy to use their own
appraiser, obtain a new appraisal, or request a letter of assignment to use an
appraisal initiated by a former underwriter and to not make lending decisions on
the basis of an appraisal, even if the same be complete, that is informally
submitted by another underwriter."
In the court's view, the foregoing evidence cited by Defendants establishes,primafacie,
that Massey did not assume any duty to Idahy by preparation of the Appraisal Report for
Clearwater Mortgage. Massey prepared the Appraisal Report for Clearwater, as his client and
the intended user, for purposes of Clearwater's consideration of a loan application to the Hruzas.
The Appraisal report, in Paragraph 21, identifies a specific list of parties to whom Clearwater is
authorized to disclose the Report. Pursuant to Paragraph 23 of the Report, Massey assumed a
duty to any such party or parties to whom Clearwater disclosed the Report by stating that such
parties "may rely on this appraisal report as part of any mortgage finance transaction that
involves any one or more of these parties." The Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca states that Idahy
never received an assignment of the Report from Clearwater. While Plaintiff alleges that Massey
assumed a duty to Idahy as "another lender at the request of the borrower," there is no evidence
in the record to support the conclusion that Clearwater disclosed the Report to Hruza or that
Hruza requested that Clearwater disclose the Report to Idahy. In fact, the only evidence
provided by Plamtiff with respect to how it came into possession of the Report is its own

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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deposition testimony that it "never identified - I'm not aware that we ever identified how we got
the appraisal."
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing
Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief for Professional Negligence is granted.
II. Plaintiff's Claim for Negligent Misrepresentation
Plaintiff's Second Claim for Relief (Negligent Misrepresentation) includes the following
allegations:
25. The Defendants' representation to Idahy that the Property was worth $1,150,000.00 was
false.
26. The Defendants were negligent both in formulating the appraisal and in accepting
payment for the appraisal containing the false value of the Property.
27. The Defendants violated the standard of care in formulating the appraisal.
28. Idahy reasonably relied on the appraisal to be an accurate representation of the value of
the property in making a loan to Hruza.
As recently as 2007, the Idaho Supreme Court emphasized that "this Court strictly and
narrowly confined the tort of negligent misrepresentation to professional relationships involving
an accountant." Mannas v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 935, 155 P.3d 1166, 1174 (2007) (citing Duffin

v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 895 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1995). As the Court
concluded in Mannas, "This case does not involve a professional accounting relationship ....
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on this claim."
Based on the foregoing precedent, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
dismissing Plaintiffs Second Claim for Relief (Negligent Misrepresentation) is granted.

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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III. Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Claim
Plaintiffs Third Claim for Relief (Breach of Contract) includes the following allegations:
31. The appraisal report prepared by the Defendants expressly authorized Idahy, a "lender at
the request of the borrower," to rely on the appraisal report in approving the second
mortgage loan to the Hruzas.
32. An assignment of the right to rely on the representations made in the appraisal report was
transferred to Idahy when the Defendants received and accepted payment from Idahy in
exchange for the appraisal.
33. Privity to enforce the promises contained in the appraisal report was created between
Idahy and the Defendants when Clearwater assigned its rights under the contract to Idahy.
34. The Defendants breached the contract by failing to render the contracted-for performance
to Idahy.
3 5. The Plaintiff has suffered damages on account of the Defendants' breach of contract.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "if a cause of action for breach of a duty based
upon a contractual promise could also be maintained without the contract by virtue of a statutory
or common law duty, then the action is founded upon tort, not contract." Sumpter v. Holland

Realty, Inc., 140 Idaho 349, 354, 93 P.3d 680, 685 (2004). The Sumpter Court relied upon the
earlier case of Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 138, 483 P.2d 664, 669 (1971) for this
proposition: "As Taylor states above, '[i]f the relation of the plaintiff and the defendants is such
that a duty to take care arises therefrom irrespective of contract and the defendant is negligent,
then the action is one of tort."' Id. at 353. While a contract may create a state of things that

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
- 10 -

20

furnishes the occasion for a tort, if the duty to take care arises irrespective of the contract and the
defendant is negligent then the action sounds in tort, not contract. Id.
The evidence before the court indicates that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is based
exclusively on Massey's alleged negligence in preparing the Appraisal Report. While Plaintiff
alleges that the relationship between Massey and Idahy was created by contract, the duty
Plaintiff alleges Massey owed to it arises independent of the alleged contract (the duty to
exercise due care, regardless of any standard set forth in a contract).
In light of this, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's Third
Claim of Relief for Breach of Contract is granted.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In view of the foregoing, the court need not reach Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing the
claims asserted against them in this action is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

I~
Dated this J/L_day of February, 2012.

,~_
. (?,~_
( ..
·

.Jjlineal C. Kerrick
Uistrict Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the
following, either by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid; by hand delivery; by courthouse
basket; or by facsimile copy:

Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200
Boise, Idaho 83 703
Patrick J. Collins
Collins & Coldwell, LLC
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820
Denver, Colorado 80202
John J. Browder
Lopez & Kelly, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
P.O. Box 856
Boise, Idaho 83701

Dated this - - - - - - - day of February, 2012.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO
Clerk of the Court

by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~
Deputy Clerk
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Jeffrey M. Wilson, #1615
Wilson & McColl
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200
Boise, ID 83703
Telephone: 208-345-9100

A.k 1~59M.
MAR 0 1 2012

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY

Patrick J. Collins, #13046
Collins & Coldwell, LLC
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: 303-296-7700
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CVl0-3993

WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S
FEBRUARY 16, 2012 ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff, CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc., by and through its undersigned counsel,
requests that this honorable Court reconsider its February 16, 2012 Order granting Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the claims asserted against Defendants in this
action. In support thereof, Plaintiff submits as follows:

I.

THE COURT'S ORDER MAKES FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT ARE IN
DISPUTE OR NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
The Court's February 16, 2012 Order states:

206

In the court's view, the foregoing evidence cited by Defendants
establishes, prima facie, that Massey did not assume any duty to Idahy by
preparation of the Appraisal Report for Clearwater Mortgage. Massey prepared
the Appraisal Report for Clearwater, as his client and the intended user, for
purposes of Clearwater's consideration of a loan application to the Hruzas. The
Appraisal report, in Paragraph 21, identifies the specific list of parties to whom
Clearwater is authorized to disclose the Report. Pursuant to Paragraph 23 of the
Report, Massey assumed a duty to any such party or parties to whom Clearwater
disclosed the Report by stating that such parties "may rely on this appraisal report
as part of any mortgage finance transaction that involves any one or more of these
parties." The Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca states that Idahy never received an
assignment of the Report from Clearwater. While Plaintiff alleges that Massey
assumed a duty to Idahy as "another lender at the request of the borrower," there
is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Clearwater disclosed
the Repun to Hruza or that Hruza requested that Clearwater disclose the Report to
Idahy. In fact, the only evidence provided by Plaintiff with respect to how it
came into possession of the Report is its own deposition testimony that it "never
identified - I'm not aware that we ever identified how we got the appraisal."
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
dismissing Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief for Professional Negligence is
granted.
The Court failed to consider or perhaps did not see in Plaintiffs Memoranda the
undisputed fact that Idahy Federal Credit Union (hereinafter, "Idahy FCU") issued a check for
$800 to Defendant, Capitol West Appraisals, as payment for the Appraisal. Defendant Wade
Massey (hereinafter, "Massey"), who is employed by Capitol West Appraisals and prepared the
Appraisal, admitted in his deposition that he prepared a "defective appraisal." (Id. at Pg. 10, Ln.
1-3). He said that his Appraisal "had ... errors that we were aware of, that me and my client were
aware of." (Id. at Pg. 10, Ln. 1-4). He recalled receiving payment of $800 from Icon even
though he did not correct the "errors" or inform the credit union about the errors in his
"defective" Appraisal. The $800 check, made payable to Capitol West Appraisals and A. Wade
Massey and deposited into the Defendants' bank account, conclusively demonstrates that Idahy
FCU properly paid for the Appraisal and that the Defendants accepted payment for the Appraisal
(See, Exhibit A). The Court's conclusion that there is no evidence to show how Idahy FCU came

2

into possess10n of the Appraisal is erroneous.

Idahy FCU paid for the Appraisal and the

Defendants accepted payment knowing that the Appraisal contained false and inaccurate
information.
The Court's conclusion and decision are based upon disputed facts. The Order cites the
Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca who has yet to be deposed in the litigation.

It assumes that

Menchaca's statements are true and accurate despite the fact that his Affidavit is directly
contradicted by the Certification made by Massey in the written Appraisal.

The Court has

usurped the function of a jury by making factual findings in granting summary judgment in favor
of Defendants.
The "Appraisal and Report Identification", which is signed by Massey and accompanies
Defendants' Uniform Residential Appraisal Report, lists three types of appraisals: a "self
contained" appraisal; a "summary" appraisal; and a "restricted use" appraisal. Each type of
appraisal contains a box next to the title. Notably, Defendants' Appraisal has a check next to the
box labeled "summary", clearly meaning that the Appraisal could be used and relied upon by
Idahy FCU as set forth below. The Court appears to rely heavily on the deposition testimony
that Idahy FCU CEO, at the time of her deposition, stated "... I'm not aware that we ever
identified how we got the appraisal." However, she did know and had proof that Idahy FCU paid
the Defendants for the Appraisal and relied upon it in making the loan. The fact that she did not
know the details of how the Appraisal was delivered or received by Idahy FCU is not dispositive.
USPAP Standard 2-2(c) requires that a "specific use" or "restricted use" appraisal state a
prominent restriction that limits use of the report to a specified client and warns that the
appraiser's opinions and conclusions set forth in the report many not be understood properly
without additional information in the appraiser's work file. However, in this case, Defendants

3
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did not identify the Appraisal as a "restricted use" appraisal, but rather identified it as a
"summary" appraisal under USP AP Standard 2-2(b ).

Standard 2-2(b) requires only that an

appraiser state the identity of the client or any intended user by name or type. In this case,
Massey did identify the identity of the clients by both "name" and "type."
In light of the fact that the Appraisal was identified by Defendants as a "summary"

appraisal, Paragraph 23 provided:
"THE BORROWER, ANOTHER LENDER AT THE REQUEST OF THE
BORROWER, THE MORTGAGEE OR ITS SUCCESSORS OR ASSIGNS ...
MAY RELY ON THIS APPRAISAL REPORT AS PART OF ANY
MORTGAGE FINANCE TRANSACTION THAT INVOLVES ANY ONE OR
MORE OF THESE PARTIES."
In addition, the Appraiser Certification (hereafter, "Certification") contained in the Appraisal

stated in Paragraph 21 that lender/client (Clearwater Mortgage):
"MAY DISCLOSE OR DISTRIBUTE THIS REPORT TO: ... ANOTHER
LENDER AT THE REQUEST OF THE BORROWER, A MORTGAGEEE OR
ITS SUCCESSORS OR ASSIGNS .... "
Defendants' identification of an "intended user" of its Appraisal by type is in accordance
with the USP AP definition of "intended user," as follows:
"THE CLIENT AND ANY OTHER PARTY AS IDENTIFIED, BY NAME OR
BY TYPE, AS USERS OF THE APPRAISAL, APPRAISAL REVIEW, OR
APPRAISAL CONSULTING REPORT BY THE APPRAISER ON THE BASIS
OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE CLIENT AT THE TIME OF
ASSIGNMENT."
Not only does USPAP, quoted above, allow for an "intended user" to be identified by
"type," but, significantly, the language of the Appraisal signed by Massey as the "appraiser"
clearly evidences the fact that Defendants agreed to engage Idahy FCU as an "intended user" of
the Appraisal.

Defendants' "Appraisal and Report Identification" confirms that an "intended

user" of Defendants' Appraisal may be identified by type. Further, Defendants specified the
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"type" of "intended user" of the Appraisal when they chose to include language in the Appraisal
stating that a lender or mortgagee "may rely on this Appraisal Report as part of any mortgage
finance transaction."

Defendants also included language in the Certification stating that the

client may "disclose or distribute this report .... at the request of the borrower." All of this
language, viewed in the aggregate, clearly evidences a duty owed by Defendants to Idahy FCU
who, under the terms of the Appraisal, was entitled to rely on the Appraisal as a lender of the
Hrnzas' mortgage loan.
The Court erroneously concludes that the standard of care was not breached because the
Appraisal was not a "report" that Idahy FCU was authorized to rely upon when making a
mortgage loan to the Hrnzas. However, in Defendants' own Appraisal, Massey certified and
agreed that "another lender" could rely on the Appraisal in making a mortgage loan to the
Hrnzas, which was secured by the subject property in the Appraisal report.
The Court expressed the opinion that Idahy FCU was not entitled to rely on the Appraisal
because the Appraisal was prepared "exclusively" for Clearwater Mortgage based on the
Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca. However, that claim is not an undisputed fact. If it was prepared
"exclusively" for Clearwater, why did Massey accept and deposit Idahy FCU's check as payment
for its use of the Appraisal? The Defendants' Certification on the Appraisal report itself directly
contradicts the claims asserted in Menchaca's Affidavit. Further, Defendants' argument ignores
the fact that the Defendants accepted a check from Idahy FCU in the amount of $800, payable to
"Capitol West Appraisals and A. Wade Massey," as payment for the Appraisal. While the fact
that Idahy FCU tendered a check to the Defendants as payment for services rendered may not, in
and of itself, be considered a "bargained-for exchange", the Defendants' subsequent acceptance
and negotiation of the $800 check from Idahy FCU fulfilled the consideration requirement.
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Defendants' acceptance of payment from Idahy FCU for its Appraisal is direct evidence of the
Defendants' consent to Idahy FCU's use of and reliance upon the Appraisal report.

The

Defendants' statement that " ... Idahy improperly obtained a copy of the appraisal.. .. " is not only
false, it is preposterous in the light of the facts. Defendants' own words and Certification convey

an intent and expectation that the Appraisal could be used and relied upon by "another lender at
the request of the borrower." Defendants' arguments to the contrary are specious, defy common
sense, and are wholly unsupported by the facts.
At a minimum, there presently exists a dispute, to be decided by a jury, as to whether
Defendants' acceptance of payment supports a conclusion that Idahy FCU was an "intended user"
of Defendants' Appraisal.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether a trial is necessary. White v.
Sort Intern Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is appropriate when
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50, P.3d 488, 491 (2002).

In

this case, the Court's Order ignores that the underlying facts are disputed and that there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Idahy FCU was entitled to use and rely upon
the Appraisal after paying Defendants the fee for preparation of the Appraisal.
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court can review the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, to determine whether
there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Ray v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 120 Idaho 117,
814 P.2d 17 (1991). The Appellate Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used
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by the District Court in passing upon the motion. McDonald v. Paine, 119 Idaho 725, 810 P.2d
259 (1991). All facts in the record and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are
viewed in favor of the party contesting the motion. Treasure Valley Bank v. Butcher, 117 Idaho
974, 793 P.2d 206 (1990).
The facts are that Idahy FCU tendered payment to the Defendants, the Defendants
accepted that payment, and the Defendants deposited that payment in their bank account. In
light of these facts, a reasonable inference would be that the Credit Union reasonably relied on
an Appraisal for which it tendered payment.

III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

In Hice v. Lott, 223 P.3d 139 (Colo. App. 2009), the Appellate Court in Colorado stated
that when a claim of negligence is based on an allegation that a licensed appraiser was negligent,
the Plaintiff must show that the conduct fell below the standard of care associated with that
profession. See also, Redden v. SCI Colo. Funeral Servs., Inc., 38 P.3d 75, 80-81 (Colo. 2001).
Further, in Command Commc'ns. Inc. v. Fritz Cos., 36 P. 3d. 182, 189 (Colo. App. 2001) the
Colorado Court of Appeals states the applicable standard of care in a professional negligence
case as follows:
For those practicing a profession involving specialized knowledge
or skill, the applicable standard of care generally requires the actor
to possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability
and to exercise reasonable care in a manner consistent with
members of the profession in good standing.
There is no legal or factual requirement that the party using and relying on an appraisal
prove how they obtained the appraisal, especially when the appraiser admits he was paid for his
work. However, in this case, it is undisputed that Idahy FCU paid Defendant $800 for its use of
the Appraisal in making a $250,000 loan.
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In 1989, the United States Congress passed comprehensive legislation, the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), to address problems
created by the savings and loan failures of the 1980s. The failures of these financial institutions
were caused, in part, by "faulty and fraudulent" appraisals of real estate collateral that undercut
the financial stability of these lenders. H. Rep. No. 101-54(1), at 311 (1989). To address this
causative factor, Congress established certain requirements for real estate appraisals connected to
federally-related transactions, including mandating that real estate appraisals be conducted "in
accordance with uniform standards, by individuals whose competency has been demonstrated
and whose professional conduct will be subject to effective supervision." 12 U.S.C. §3331. The
State of Idaho has adopted the uniform standards in the Idaho Real Estate Appraiser's Act §544107.
Under this regulatory framework, real estate appraisers are subject to a variety of
requirements, and, based on their training and experience, must be certified, licensed, or
registered. Id. at §54-4107. Their work is governed by rules and regulations issued by the Board
of Real Estate Appraisers.

They may be disciplined or have their certification, license, or

registration denied, suspended, or revoked for misconduct.

Certain types of misconduct are

unlawful and can subject offenders to criminal penalties.
The Idaho Division of Real Estate adopted USP AP as "the generally accepted standards
of professional appraisal practice."

The preamble to USP AP states that the purpose of the

standards is as follows:
... to promote and maintain a high level of public trust in appraisal
practice by establishing requirements for appraisers. It is essential
that appraisers develop and communicate their analyses, opinions,
and conclusions to intended users of their services in a manner that
is meaningful and not misleading.

8

Based upon Idaho's comprehensive legislative structure, real estate appraisers practice a
profession involving knowledge and/or skill, and their conduct should be judged according to the
tenets of their field. The Court's Order in effect contravenes public policy as set forth in the
FIRREA or the USP AP and allows an appraiser to accept payment for an admittedly defective
that
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CONCLUSION

In this case, there is no question that the Defendants violated the standard of care.
Indeed, Massey admitted that his appraisal was "defective and had ... errors" (See Exhibit F, Pg.
10, Ln. 1-4) and that no one should have relied upon it.

However, despite the fact that the

Appraisal was "defective" and "had errors", Massey certified in writing that "the borrowers,
another lender at the request of the borrower, the mortgagee or its successors and assigns, and the
mortgage insurers ... may rely on this Appraisal report as part of any mortgage finance
transaction that involves any one or more of these parties." The Appraisal was not exclusively
prepared for Clearwater Mortgage and it was properly used by Idahy FCU. The Defendants
accepted payment from Idahy FCU with full knowledge that the Appraisal was defective and
should not be relied upon or otherwise used in approving a loan.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its Order
granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and allow this case to proceed to trial.
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DATED this ).,.Oz day of February, 2012.
Respectfully submitted,
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC

·\:VI~~
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By: Patrick J. Collins
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Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351
John J. Browder, ISB #7531
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, ID 83701-0856
Telephone: (208) 342-4300
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344
2700.024\Judgment.wpd

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CVlO - 3993

JUDGMENT

vs.
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment on
February 9, 2012, and the Court having granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants Wade
Massey and Capitol West Appraisals in its February 17, 2012, Order on Motions for Summary
Judgment;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does hereby order that judgment is entered in favor of
Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals and against the Plaintiff Cumis Insurance
Society, Inc., and that all claims asserted by Plaintiff Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. against

JUDGMENT-I

21.7

Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals are dismissed with prejudice.
Further, the Court shall consider the issue of costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 54
of the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure upon application by the Defendants within fourteen ( 14) days
of the date of this J udgmen~~ined, if requested, by supplemental order of this Court.
DATED this 15.day of March, 2012.
I

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of March, 2012, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated
below, addressed as follows:

~

Michael E. Kelly
John J. Browder
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-4300
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344

D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

~U.S.Mail

Jeffrey M. Wilson
WILSON & MCCOLL
420 W. Washington
PO Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-9100
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442
Attorney for Plaintiff

D
D
D

JUDGMENT-2

21.8

Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

'

I

~.S.Mail

Patrick J. Collins
COLLJNS & COLDWELL, LLC
700 17rh St., Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 296-7700
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160
Attorney for Plaintiff

0
0

0

Clerk of the Court

JUDGMENT-3

21.9

Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351
John J. Browder, ISB #7531
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, ID 83701-0856
Telephone: (208) 342-4300
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344
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2700.024\ResponseMotionReconsideration.wpd

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,

Case No. CVlO - 3993

DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND
CAPITOL WEST'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Plaintiff,
vs.
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

By and through undersigned counsel, Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals
(sometimes hereinafter "Defendants" or "Massey") file their Response to Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration ("Response"). This Response is supported by the pleadings, papers and affidavits lilcd
in this lawsuit.

I.

INTRODUCTION
Massey moved for summary judgment on each of the Plaintiff's three causes of action: ( 1)

DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION- 1
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negligence; (2) negligent misrepresentation; and (3) breach of contract. In its Order on Motions for
Summary Judgment ("Order"), the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Massey, ruling that: (I)
Massey did not assume and, therefore, did not owe a legal duty to Idahy; (2) Idaho does not recognize a
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against appraisers; and (3) Plaintiff's breach of contract
claim failed because it was based only on Massey's alleged negligence.
In its Motion for Reconsideration, the Plaintiff challenges the Court's Order, contending the Court
usurped the role of the jury because, according to it, Defendant's acceptance of the check raised a question
of material fact whether Idahy was the Intended User of the appraisal. Plaintiff's argument is not new, and
it is as unavailing now as it was when the Plaintiff first advanced it. As established by the affidavit of
appraiser Joe Huffman, payment does not give rise to the appraiser-client relationship. Moreover, the
Plaintiff's narrative about the $800.00 check is misleading and controverted by Idahy's Connie Miller's
own notes on the issue and in any case, the existence of a duty is a legal question, not a factual one.
In sum, there is nothing erroneous with the Court's analysis and ruling that Massey did not as:-.ume
a legal duty toward Idahy. In light of the following undisputed facts, the Court's reasoning is ironclad and
should not be disturbed:

•

Idahy was not the Intended User of Massey's appraisal.

•

Idahy was not a Client of Massey .

•

There was no appraiser/client relationship between Massey and Idahy .

•

Massey has never spoken with anybody at Idahy and did not know Idahy had received a
copy of the appraisal until after the borrowers, the Hruzas, already had defaulted.

•

Idahy does not even know how it obtained Massey's appraisal.

•

As between Massey and his Client/Intended User, Clearwater Mortgage, Inc., the appraisal
was an incomplete , inchoate or rescinded work product that was not to be relied upon.

DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION- 2
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Nothing in the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration alters those facts or calls into question the Court's
analysis. As such, Massey respectfully requests the Court deny Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.
II.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The $800.00 Check Is Irrelevant to Whether an Appraiser-Client Relationship Was
Formed or a Legal Duty Owed.

A.

Plaintiff emphasizes that the Court failed to consider the portion of its Memorandum discussing
the $800.00 check. But as the Court likely will recall, there was considerable discussion at oral argument
regarding the check Idahy issued to Massey, and, indeed, the Court questioned both attorneys about it. 1
More importantly, as established by the uncontroverted affidavit of Joe Huffman, payment does not create
an appraiser-client relationship. Rather, it is the "engagement for an 'Assignment,' not payment ... that
creates the appraiser-client relationship." See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at <][ 10 . Nor was Idahy an
Intended User. See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at<][ 8.
Unlike's Massey's position, Plaintiff's interpretation lacks any supporting affidavit. Moreover,
it is fatally undercut by USPAP's advice on the issue and devolves into the absurd proposition that mere
receipt of an undisputedly rescinded appraisal services report, and belated payment for the same, exposes
the appraiser to tort liability. While Massey will not belabor Mr. Huffman's affidavit, it is worth noting
USPAP Advisory Opinion 26 (2008) 2, a copy of which is attached hereto for the Com1's convenience,

1

Plaintiff continues to ignore the fact that the check was one of many cashed by Massey's
bookkeeper; nor is there anything ou the face of the check that identifies for which property
appraisal it was payment.
2

The 2006-2007 USP AP was in force at the times relevant to the lawsuit. Nonetheless,
because copies of USP AP are somewhat difficult to obtain, Massey has relied on the 2008-2009
version because, as explained in the attached section regarding changes, Advisory Opinion 26
was not impacted by the new USP AP version.
DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
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supports the analysis and conclusions contained in the Affidavit, specifically, that the "agreement" between
the appraiser and client is paramount for establishing rights, responsibilities and obligations between
appraisers and their clients. For example, USP AP does not permit the "readdressing" of a report to another
party. See Adv. Op. 26, at 11. 8-11 & 29 -30. The Intended User, as noted by Mr. Huffman, is also a
function of the "agreement" between the client and appraiser. See Adv. Op. 26, at 11. 37-40. An appraiser
cannot identify a new intended user of the assignment ex post facto absent a new "assignment." See
USPAP FAQ 73 (2008-2009), a copy of which is attached hereto for the Court's convenience. This
accords with Mr. Huffman's analysis, as well as Mr. Menchaca's affidavit testimony that Idahy failed to
procure the customary assignment of appraisal.
Additionally, the Plaintiff's assertion that Massey's argument that Idahy' s obtainment of a copy
of the rescinded appraisal report was improper is "false" and "preposterous" is off the mark. Once again.
Massey's position on this issue is supported Joe Huffman's affidavit. See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at
q[ 14. Plaintiff, by contrast, provides no support for the proposition that it is proper, let alone prudent, to
rely on a report of unverified provenance, and by an appraiser with whom Idahy -to this day- has never
spoken to make a $250,000.00 decision. Again, as Massey pointed out at oral argument, this case could
have been avoided with a 30 second phone call from anybody at Idahy to either Massey or Ernie
Menchaca. One would think that with $250,000 on the line, someone at Idahy would have picked up the
phone and made the simple call.
The Court v1a.s correct in declining to find a legal duty where Idahy was not Massey's Client or the
Intended User of the inchoate appraisal, and, indeed, where Massey has never spoken with anybody at
Idahy in his life. The law simply does not contemplate saddling an individual with potential ton I iab1 I ity
under the facts of this case. If it did, USP AP' s concepts of" Assignment," "Client," "Intended Use" and
"Intended User" would be rendered superfluous nullities. It also would result in an unprecedented
DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION- 4

223

broadening of appraiser tort liability.

B.

Massey Offered to Give the Check Back.

Because the Plaintiff continues to emphasize the $800.00 check, it is worth noting that Massey, by
and through an attorney, tried to give it back. On page 4 of the Plaintiff's Response to Defendants Wade
Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
("Plaintiff's Response"), the Plaintiff relies on an account of a conversation between Idahy CEO, Connie
Miller and Ray Schild, Massey's attorney which was authored by Ms. Miller. As evidenced by Exhibit
G, deposition of Connie Miller, a copy of which is attached to Plaintiff's Response, Millerreportedly asked
attorney Shild after the Hruzas defaulted why Massey accepted payment. Schild did not, as Plaintiff
mischaracterizes, say that "he did not wish to comment on the $800 payment at that point." Exhibit G,
deposition of Connie Miller. Instead, Mr. Schild asked "[d]o you want your $800 bucks back?" Exhibit
G, deposition of Connie Miller. According to Ms. Miller's own notes, she then replied that "I did not wish
to comment on that at this point." Exhibit G, deposition of Connie Miller. It is reasonable to surmise that
Ms. Miller declined Mr. Shild's offer to preserve the exact argument the Plaintiff is making now.

C.

Menchaca's Affidavit is Undisputed and Court Was Correct in Relying on it to the
Extent it Did.

The Plaintiff's claim that the decision is based on disputed facts because it assumes Mechanca's
affidavit was true is bewildering and of no moment. Mr. Menchaca, who the Plaintiff could have deposed
earlier in the case, avowed that Clearwater Mortgage and Massey rescinded the agreement to perform
appraisal services. See Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca, at <JI<J[ 8, 9. That is not disputed. And that fact, by
itself, vitiates Plaintiff's continued reliance on language in the Appraisal report. Nor is it disputed that
receipt of the appraisal by Idahy would not create the appraiser-client relationship, as it is the engagement
for an appraisal Assignment that creates that relationship. See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at <J[<J[ 9, I 0 & 12.

DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
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Absent that relationship or Intended User classification, it is impossible to fathom how Massey assumed
a legal duty to Idahy.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in the record, Massey respectfully requests that the Court deny
the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.
DA TED this Z 3 day of March, 2012.
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC

By:~~~~~--~~~~

Michael E. Kelly
Attorneys for the Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this '2.~ day of March, 2012, I served a true and correct copy uf
the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated below,
addressed as follows:
Jeffrey M. Wilson
WILSON & MCCOLL
420 W. Washington
PO Box 1544
Boise, ID 8370 l
Telephone: (208) 345-9100
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442
Attorney for Plaintiff
Patrick J. Collins
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC
700 17th St., Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 296-7700
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160
Attorney for Plaintiff
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U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

0
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Michael
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FOREWORD

The Appraisal Standards Board (ASB) of The Appraisal Foundation develops, interprets, and amends the
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP) on behalf of appraisers and users of appraisal
services. The 2008-2009 Edition of USPAP (2008-2009 USPAP) is effective January 1, 2008 through
December 31, 2009.
USPAP has five sections: DEFINITIONS, PREAMBLE, Rules, Standards and Standards Rules, and Statements
on Appraisal Standards. For convenience ofreference, USPAP is published with this Foreword and a Table of
Contents. These reference materials are forms of "Other Communications" provided by the ASB for guidance
only and are not part of USP AP.
It is important that individuals understand and adhere to changes in each edition of USPAP. State and federal
regulatory authorities enforce the content of the current or applicable edition ofUSPAP.

History ofUSPAP
These Standards are based on the original Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice developed in
1986-87 by the Ad Hoc Committee on Uniform Standards and copyrighted in 1987 by The Appraisal
Foundation. The effective date of the original Uniform Standards was April 27, 1987. Prior to the establishment
of the ASil in 1989, USPAP had been adopted by major appraisal organizations in North America. USPAP
represents the generally accepted and recognized standards of appraisal practice in the United States.
At its organizational meeting on January 30, 1989, the Appraisal Standards Board unanimously approved and
adopted the original USPAP as the initial appraisal standards promulgated by the ASB. USPAP may be
amended, interpreted, supplemented, or retired by the ASB after exposure to the appraisal profession, users of
appraisal services, and the public in accordance with established rules of procedure.

Guidance
The ASB issues guidance in the form of Advisory Opinions, USPAP Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) and
monthly questions and responses "USPAP Q&A." These communications do not establish new Standards or
interpret existing Standards and are not part ofUSPAP. They illustrate the applicability of Standards in specific
situations and offer advice from the ASB for the resolution of appraisal issues and problems.
The USPAP Q&A is published monthly and available on The Appraisal Foundation website. These questions
and responses are compiled and published in the USPAP Frequently Asked Questions.

Changes to USPAP
Over the years, USPAP has evolved in response to changes in appraisal practice. The ASB has developed a
process for developing both Standards and guidance based, in part, on written comments submitted in response
to exposure drafts and oral testimony presented at public meetings.

Contacting the Appraisal Standards Board
The ASB invites questions about USPAP, commentary on USPAP and proposed changes to USPAP from all
interested parties, including appraisers, state enforcement agencies, users of appraisal services, and the public.

©The Appraisal Foundation
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If you have any comments, questions, or suggestions regarding USPAP, please contact the ASB.
Appraisal Standards Board
The Appraisal Foundation
1155 15th Street, NW, Suite 1111
Washington, DC 20005
Phone:202-347-7722
Fax: 202-347-7727
E-Mail: info@appraisalfoundation.org
www.appraisalfoundation.org
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APPRAISAL STANDARDS BOARD
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2007 APPRAISAL STANDARDS BOARD MEMBERS

Gregory J. Accetta - Chair
Noreen Domenburg - Vice Chair
Paula K. Konikoff
Dawn M. Molitor-Gennrich
William J. Pastuszek, Jr.
William Henry Riley
(The 2008-2009 USPAP was adopted by the 2007 Appraisal Standards Board on June 8, 2007.)

STANDARDS BOARD MEMBERS

Gregory J. Accetta - Chair
Paula K. Konikoff - Vice Chair
James D. Cannon
Carla G. Glass
Dawn M. Molitor-Gennrich
William J. Pastuszek, Jr.
Danny K. Wiley
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Past Appraisal Standards Board Officers and Members

1989 Board Members
Charles B. Akerson - Chair
John J. Leary - Vice Chair
Sherwood Darington
Daniel A. Dinote, Jr.
John L. Gadd

1990 Board Members
John J. Leary - Chair
Sherwood Darington - Vice Chair
Daniel A. Dinote, Jr.
John L. Gadd
Charles B. Akerson
1991 Board Members
John J. Leary - Chair
Sherwood Darington - Vice Chair
Daniel A. Dinote, Jr.
John L. Gadd
Charles B. Akerson
1992 Board Members
John J. Leary - Chair
Sherwood Darington - Vice Chair
Daniel A. Dinote, Jr.
John L. Gadd
Ritch LeGrand
1993 Board Members
Ritch LeGrand - Chair
Sherwood Darington - Vice Chair
Daniel A. Dinote, Jr.
John L. Gadd
John J. Leary
1994 Board Members
Sherwood Darington - Chair
Daniel A. Dinote, Jr. - Vice Chair
Tim Leberman
John J. Leary
Ritch LeGrand

1995 Board Members
Sherwood Darington - Chair
Tim Lebennan - Vice Chair
Daniel A. Dinote, Jr.
W. David Snook
Laurie Van Court
1996 Board Members
W. David Snook - Chair
Laurie Van Court- Vice Chair
Stephanie Coleman
Tim Lebe1man
1997 Board Members
W. David Snook - Chair
Laurie Van Court - Vice Chair
Stephanie Coleman
Kenneth J. Kaiser
Tim Leberman
1998 Board Members
Tim Leberman - Chair
Kenneth J. Kaiser - Vice Chair
Stephanie Coleman
Yale Kramer
W. David Snook
Laurie Van Comt
1999 Board Members
Kenneth J. Kaiser - Chair
Tim Lebennan - Vice Chair
Yale Kramer
Lawrence E. Ofner
W. David Snook
Laurie Van Court
2000 Board Members
Kenneth J. Kaiser - Chair
Yale Kramer
Lawrence E. Ofner
W. David Snook
Richard A. Southern
Laurie Van Comt
*No Vice Chair

2001 Board Members
Kenneth J. Kaiser - Chair
Richard A. Southern - Vice Chair
Thomas 0. Jackson
Carla G. Glass
Lawrence E. Ofner
Danny K. Wiley

2002 Board Members
Danny K. Wiley - Chair
Lawrence E. Ofner - Vice Chair
Carla G. Glass
Thomas 0. Jackson
Kenneth J. Kaiser
Richard A. Southern
2003 Board Members
Danny K. Wiley - Chair
Lawrence E. Ofner - Vice Chair
Gregory J. Accetta
Carla G. Glass
Paula K. Konikoff
Dawn M. Molitor-Gennrich
2004 Board Members
Danny K. Wiley - Chair
Carla G. Glass - Vice Chair
Gregory J. Accetta
Paula K. Konikoff
Dawn M. Molitor-Gennrich
Lawrence E. Ofner
2005 Board Members
Carla G. Glass - Chair
Gregory J. Accetta - Vice Chair
James D. Cannon
Paula K. Konikoff
Dawn M. Molitor-Gennrich
Danny K. Wiley
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REVISIONS TO USPAP AND USP AP ADVISORY OPINIONS
The 2008-2009 edition ofUSPAP is the result of two exposure drafts, issued on December 15, 2006 and March
5, 2007. Based on written responses, public testimony at Appraisal Standards Board (ASB) public meetings,
and extensive deliberation by the Board, the ASB adopted the 2008-2009 USPAP on June 8, 2007. The adopted
changes are incorporated in the 2008-2009 USPAP and associated guidance effective January 1, 2008 through
December 31, 2009.

KEY CHANGES IN USPAP AND ADVISORY OPINIONS
DEFINITIONS: The definition of Supplemental Standards was deleted.
•

•
•

The majority of appraisers, users of appraisal services, and enforcement officials recognize that
Supplemental Standards include laws and regulations. Appraisers must comply with laws and
regulations because of the nature of law itself, not because of USPAP. Thus, continued use of
Supplemental Standards as a defined term was unnecessary.
Descriptions of"laws" and "regulations" are provided in the SCOPE OF WORK RULE based on their
respective Black's Law Dictionary definitions.
The deletion of the definition removes specific recognition of Government Sponsored Enterprises
(GSE) as a source of assignment conditions because they provide guidelines, which are not laws or
regulations. However, the edits do not change 1) the necessity for an appraiser acting in compliance
with USPAP to follow GSE guidelines where applicable; and, 2) the enforcement ofUSPAP, including
those items necessary for competent performance and meaningful reporting.

DEFINITIONS: The definition of Advocacy was deleted.
•

EJits to the Conduct Section of the ETHICS RULE rendered the definition unnecessary because the
tem1 is used with its common English meaning.

ETHICS RULE: Edits were made to the Conduct section of the ETHICS RULE related to advocacy.
•

The edits make clear that advocating the cause or interest of any party or issue contradicts the
requirement for independence. The changes do not diminish the prohibition against advocacy in
appraisal practice; advocacy remains unacceptable.

SUPPLEMENTAL STANDARDS RULE: The SUPPLEMENTAL STANDARDS RULE was deleted
because the other requirements ofUSPAP eliminate the need for the Rule.
•

The duty for the appraiser to comply with applicable assignment conditions is embedded in the
obligations to provide ethical and competent services. The SCOPE OF WORK RULE requires
appraisers to identify the problem to be solved, which includes identification of assignment conditions.
In communicating assignment results, the requirement that repo1is be meaningful and not misleading
creates an obligation to comply with applicable laws, regulations, and guidelines.

Associated Changes to the SCOPE OF WORK RULE, the Conduct section of the ETHICS RULE and
the COMPETENCY RULE:
•

•

•

The SCOPE OF WORK RULE has been edited to replace the term "Supplemental Standards" with
"laws and regulations." This change highlights and focuses the SCOPE OF WORK RULE on
assignment conditions that have legal force.
The SCOPE OF WORK RULE states that it is the appraiser's responsibility to identify the problem to
be solved. Therefore, the Conduct section of the ETHICS RULE was modified to remove text that
identifies the need for an agreement between the client and appraiser when accepting an assignment
when supplemental standards apply.
Text was added to the COMPETENCY RULE to acknowledge that appraisers must recognize and
comply with laws and regulations that apply in an assignment. Laws and regulations may apply to the
actions of the appraiser, or may apply to how an appraisal must be completed.

U-v
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With these changes, USPAP continues to require adherence to those assignment conditions that are necessary
for proper development and reporting.

Standards Rule 2-3, Standards Rule 3-3, Standards Rule 5-3, Standards Rule 6-9, Standards Rule 8-3,
and Standards Rule 10-3: Edits were made to remove the requirement that the signing appraiser have a
reasonable basis to believe that work done by others was credible. Language was added clarifying that the
signing appraiser(s) must not rely on the work of others ifthat appraiser has a reason to doubt that the work is
credible.
Standards Rules 7-3(a), 8-2(a)(ix), 6-3(b), and 6-8(n): Edits were made to the personal property appraisal
requirements to identify and report the highest and best use:
•

The edits do not change the substance of the requirements, but better align the language with
terminology more commonly used in personal property appraisal.

Standards Rule 1-6(b), Standards Rule 6-7(a), Standards Rule 7-6(b), and Standards Rule 9-S(b): Edits
were made to the requirements for reconciliation of the approaches used to arrive at the value in each Standards
Rule. The Comment to Standards Rule 1-6 and the Comment to Standards Rule 7-6 were deleted.
•

The edits were made for clarity and consistency.

Standards Rules 2-2(a)(vi), 2-2(b)(vi), & 2-2(c)(vi), Standards Rule 6-S(g), and Standards Rules 8-2(a)(vi),
8-2(b)(vi), & 8-2(c)(vi): The phrase "property use conditions" was shortened to "property." The portion of the
Comment to each Standards Rule requiring reiteration of the report date and effective date of the appraisal was
deleted.
•

The edits were made for clarity and consistency.

STATEMENT 10 (Retired): The Statement titled Assignments for Use by a Federally insured Depository
institution in a Federally Related Transaction was retired. Some of the issues addressed in STATEMENT 10
have been incorporated into the new Advisory Opinion 30, Appraisals for Use by a Federally Regulated
Financial institution.
•

•
•

The Statement did not distinguish between laws (such as FIRREA), regulations and guidelines (such as
the Interagency Appraisal and Evaluation Guidelines) resulting in confusion for both appraisers and
users of appraisal services.
The format and complexity of STATEMENT I 0 were obstacles to its understanding and effective
enforcement.
Substantial editing of STATEMENT 10 would not have resulted in increased understanding.

ADVISORY OPINION 30 (New): Appraisals for Use by a Federally Regulated Financial Institution replaces
the advice from retired STATEMENT 10 and addresses adherence to the applicable laws, regulations, and
guidelines of the federal financial institution regulatory agencies required for proper appraisal development and
reporting.
ADVISORY OPINION 5 (Retired): Assistance in the Preparation of an Appraisal was retired because of the
need to update and expand its guidance. The new Advisory Opinion 31, Assignments Involving More than One
Appraiser meets these needs.
ADVISORY OPINION 31 (New): Assignments involving More than One Appraiser offers advice on record
keeping, signature and certification requirements in assignments that involve more than one appraiser.
ADVISORY OPINION 32 (New): Ad Valorem Property Tax Appraisal and Mass Appraisal Assignments
illustrates the application ofUSPAP in assignments performed by appraisers for ad valorem taxation.

©The Appraisal Foundation
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ADVISORY OPINION
ADVISORY OPINION 26 (A0-26)

4

This communication by the Appraisal Standards Board (ASB) does not establish new standards or interpret
existing standards. Advisory Opinions are issued to illustrate the applicability of appraisal standards in specific
situations and to offer advice.from the ASB for the resolution of appraisal issues and problems.

5

SUBJECT: Readdressing (Transferring) a Report to Another Party

6

APPLICATION: Real Property, Personal Property, and Intangible Property

7

THE ISSUE:

8

11

After an assignment has been completed and the report has been delivered, an appraiser may be asked to
"readdress" (transfer) the report to another party. Does USPAP allow an appraiser to "readdress" (transfer) a
report by altering it to indicate a new recipient as the client or additional intended user when the original report
was completed for another party?

12

ADVICE FROM THE ASB ON THE ISSUE:

13

Relevant USPAP & Advisory References

2
3

9

lo

•
•

14

15
16

•

17

18

•

19

20

•

21

22
23

24
25

•

26
27

•
•

The Confidentiality and Conduct sections of the ETHICS RULE.
Standards Rules such as l-2(a) and l-2(b); 7-2(a) and 7-2(b); and 9-2(a), which require an
appraiser to identify the client, intended users, and intended use.
Standards Rules such as 2-l(a), 8-l(a), 10-l(a), which require an appraiser to clearly and
accurately set forth the appraisal in a manner that is not misleading.
SCOPE OF WORK RULE, which requires an appraiser to ascertain whether other laws or
regubtions apply to the assignment in addition to USPAP.
Statement on Appraisal Standards No. 9, which requires the appraiser to identify and disclose the
client and intended users and the intended use in an appraisal, appraisal review, or appraisal
consulting assignment.
Statement on Appraisal Standards No. 10, which describes applicability of USPAP in federally
related transactions.
Advisory Opinion 25, which covers clarification of the client in a federally related transaction.
Advisory Opinion 27, which addresses appraising the same property for a new client.

28

Comments

29

30

No. Once a report has been prepared for a named client(s) and any other identified intended users and for an
identified intended use, the appraiser cannot "readdress" (transfer) the report to another party.

31

USPAP defines the Client as:
The party or parties who engage an appraiser (by employment or contract) in a specific assignment
(Bold added for emphasis).

32
33
34

Assignment is defined as:
A valuation service provided as a consequence of an agreement between an appraiser and a client
(Bold added for emphasis).

35
36

37

Intended Use is defined as:

A-90
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ADVISORY OPINION 26
38

39
40
41

42
43
44

the use or uses of an appraiser :S reported appraisal, appraisal review, or appraisal consulting
assignment opinions and conclusions, as identlfied by the appraiser based on communication with the
client at the time of the assignment (Bold added for emphasis).
Intended User is defined as:

the client and any other party as identified, by name or type, as users of the appraisal, appraisal
review, or appraisal consulting report by the appraiser on the basis of communication with the client at
the time of the assignment (Bold added for emphasis).

48

Identification of the client, any other intended users, and the intended use are key elements in all assignments.
Because th~se identifications drive the appraiser's scope of work decision, as well as other elements of the
assignment, they must be determined at the time of the assignment. They cannot be modified after an
assignment has been completed. See Statement on Appraisal Standards No. 9 for further clarification.

49

Illustrations:

50

Question # 1

51

An appraiser was engaged by Client A to appraise a property. The appraiser delivered the appraisal report to
Client A. The client has decided not to pursue the transaction that generated the need for the appraisal report.
The appraiser is contacted by Client B. Client B requests that the original report be readdressed (transferred) by
replacing Client A's name with Client B's name in the report. Is this acceptable?

45
46
47

52
53
54
55
56

Answer: No. Simply changing the client name on the report cannot change or replace the original
appraiser-client relationship that was established with Client A. Therefore, this action is misleading.

57

Question #2

58

How can this circumstance be handled according to Standards?

59
60

61
62

Answer: The appraiser can consider Client B's request as a new assignment. In so doing, the appraiser may
establish a new appraiser-client relationship with Client B and appraise the property for this new client.
Important considerations, i.e., confidential information and other factors are further addressed in A0-27 "Appraising the Same Property for a New Client".

63

Question #3

64

Why might Client B want their name on the report that was completed for Client A?

65
66
67

68

Answer: Client B may want to establish an appraiser-client relationship because it provides all the rights,
obligations, and liabilities such a relationship places on the appraiser.
A prudent method to establish an appraiser-client relationship is to have a written engagement letter or
contract with any client at the time of the assignment.
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APPRAISAL

PMENT - CLIENT ISSUES

Eventual receipt of a copy of an appraisal, appraisal review, or appraisal consulting report does not
make the recipient an intended user. To be an intended user the recipient must have been
identified as such by the appraiser.

71.

APPRAISAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY AS AUTHORIZED AGENT FOR A CLIENT

Question:

I accept assignments from an Appraisal Management Company (AMC) that has informed
me they are an authorized agent for the lenders they represent. The AMC does not want me
to list their name as the client, and asks that I only list the name of the lender they are
representing. USPAP says the appraiser's client is the party who engages the appraiser. Is it
ethical to omit the AMC's name as the client on my reports?

Response:

Yes. If the AMC is acting as a duly authorized agent for a lender, identifying only the lender as
your client is acceptable.

72.

CLIENT CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED

Question:

I was recently asked to perform an appraisal assignment but the individual that contacted
my firm was not the client and indicated that the client could not be identified. Can I accept
this assignment and comply with USP AP?

Response:

No. Standards Rule 1-2 states, in part:
In developing a real property appraisal, an appraiser must:
(a) identifY the client and other intended users; ...
This does not preclude a third party, acting as an agent for the client, from ordering the appraisal;
however, the appraiser must be able to identify the client. Refer to STATEMENT No. 9,
Identification of Intended Use and Intended Users, for further clarification.

73.

SUBSEQUENT USER REQUESTS A "RELIANCE LETTER"

Question:

I delivered an appraisal report to my client. A week later, an entity other than one of the
identified intended users contacted me and asked that I provide a "reliance letter," enabling
them to rely on the appraisal report for their own investment use. My client says they have
no problem with my doing that. Can I provide this entity with such a letter, even though I
had not originally identified them as an intended user?

Response:

No. You cannot add what is in effect a new "intended user" after the completion of an assignment,
no matter what terminology you use.
USPAP defines Intended User as:
The client and any other party as identified, by name or type, as users of the appraisal,
appraisal review, or appraisal consulting report by the appraiser on the basis of
communication with the client at the time of the assignment. (Bold added for emphasis)
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APPRAISAL DEVELOPMEf

CLIENT ISSUES

The proper way to handle this is to initiate a new assignment with this entity as the client and
provide them an appraisal, being careful to develop an appropliate scope of work consistent with
their own intended use.
This new assignment could be based on virtually the same data and analysis, and the value
conclusion might be the same. However, in the new assignment you must consider the assignment
elements most appropriate to the scope of work for that client and the assignment, which could
well be different from those of your prior client.

74.

READDRESS OR TRANSFER

Question:

Is it acceptable to readdress or transfer a completed appraisal report?

Response:

No. Once a repo1t has been prepared for a named client or clients, the appraiser cannot 'readdress'
(transfer) the rep01t to another party. Simply changing the client name on the rep01t cannot change
or replace the original appraiser-client relationship. Therefore, this action is misleading.
However, you can consider the request as a new assignment. In so doing, you may establish a new
appraiser-client relationship and appraise the property for this new client.
Additional infonnation can be found in Advisory Opinion 26, Readdressing (Transferring) a
Report to Another Party. Impo1tant considerations, such as the handling of confidential
information and other factors, are addressed in Advisory Opinion 27, Appraising the Same
Property for a New Client.

75.

READDRESSING WITH LENDER RELEASE

Question:

I am aware of Advisory Opinions: A0-26, Readdressing (Transferring) a Report to Another
Party and A0-27, Appraising the Same Property for a New Client. Does that guidance still
apply if Lender A releases me to perform another assignment, or can I just readdress the
report to Lender B since I have obtained a release?

Response:

It is never permissible to "readdress" a report by simply changing the client's name on a
completed repmt, regardless of whether the first client gave a release. The request from Lender B
must be treated as a new assignment.
Further guidance can be found in the Obtaining a Release section of Advisory Opinion 27.

FAQ 2008-2009 Edition
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Jeffrey M. Wilson, #1615
Wilson & McColl
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200
Boise, ID 83703
Telephone: 208-345-9100
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Patrick J. Collins, #13046
Collins & Coldwell, LLC
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: 303-296-7700

APR 0 6 2012
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. CVl0-3993
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS WADE MASSEY AND
CAPITOL WEST APPRAISALS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Plaintiff, CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc., by and through its undersigned counsel,
files their reply to Defendant's Response (hereinafter, "Response") to Plaintiffs Motion
for Reconsideration. In support thereof, Plaintiff submits as follows:

I. THE $800 CHECK ESTABLISHES A LEGAL DUTY OWED BY
DEFENDANTS
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It is an undisputed fact that Idahy Federal Credit Union (hereinafter, "Idahy")
issued a check for $800 to Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals, as
payment for the Appraisal of 16462 Plum Road. It is also an undisputed fact that
Defendant Wade Massey (hereinafter, Massey), who is employed by Capitol West
Appraisals and prepared the Appraisal, admitted in his deposition that he prepared a
"defective appraisal." (See Massey Deposition at Pg. 10, Ln. 1-3). He admitted that his
Appraisal "had ... errors that we were aware of..." (Id. at Pg. 10, Ln. 1-4)
Massey recalled receiving payment of the $800 check from Idahy, yet he did not
correct the "errors" or inform the credit union about the errors in his "defective"
Appraisal. The $800 check, made payable to Capitol West Appraisals and A. Wade
Massey and deposited into Massey's bank account, conclusively demonstrates that Idahy
properly paid for the Appraisal and that the Defendants accepted payment for it.
The Defendants' contention that this case could have been avoided with a "30
second phone call" raises a more troubling question as to why Massey, as the alleged
unintended recipient of the check, didn't call Idahy to inform them that the payment he
received and accepted was for an admittedly "defective approval". At the time Massey
accepted payment, he knew that he had a defective appraisal in the marketplace, and that
Idahy possessed it. Yet Massey never communicated with Idahy, rather he quickly
negotiated and deposited its check.
The Defendants have continued to claim that the "check argument" is not new,
nor unavailing. To the Defendants' dismay, the acceptance of the check is important and
should not be disregarded or viewed in a faint light. Unassailably, the undisputed fact
that the Defendants accepted the check, as payment for the appraisal he prepared,
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logically destabilizes the alleged "undisputed facts" proposed by the Defense, and
undermines the Court's Order of Summary Judgment.

II. THE COURT RELIES ON DISPUTED FACTS
The Court's conclusion that there is no evidence to show how Idahy came into
possession of the Appraisal before discover has been complete is no reason for an entry
of summary judgment against its subrogee. It is undisputed Idahy possessed Massey's
appraisal, paid for it, and relied on it when approving a loan. Idahy paid for the Appraisal
and the Defendants accepted payment knowing that the Appraisal contained false and
inaccurate information. This evidence is clear that Idahy received the Appraisal in lieu of
payment of $800. At the very least, the undisputed evidence creates a question of fact as
to the circumstances surrounding how Idahy acquired the Appraisal.
The Court, and certainly the defense, rely heavily on the deposition testimony of
Idahy CEO (Connie Miller), who at the time of her deposition, stated" ... I'm not aware
that we ever identified how we got the appraisal." This statement is not dispositive,
justifying the entry of summary judgment before discovery has been completed, as Ms.
Miller did testify that Idahy paid the Defendants for the Appraisal and relied upon it
when approving the loan.
The Defendants try to infer that the statement Ray Schlid (Massey's attorney)
made to Ms. Miller, "[d]o you want your $800 bucks back?', is evidence that Massey
wanted to return the check. However this assertion is factually false. After all of his
passage of time Massey has retained Idahy's payment for his appraisal and has never
returned it.

3
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The Defense contends that the Affidavit of appraiser Joe Huffman supports a
position that payment does not give rise to the appraiser-client relationship. However,
that is only opinion and not a fact. Either way, the opinion could hardly be viewed as
dispositive on the issue of whether acceptance of payment for an "appraisal" gives rise to
an appraiser-client relationship.
What should be given more weight on this issue is the undisputed fact that the
"Appraisal and Report Identification", which is signed by Massey and accompanies
Defendants' Uniform Residential Appraisal Report, lists the Defendants' Appraisal as a
"Swnmary" appraisal under USPAP Standard 2-2(b). Massey chose a "Summary"
appraisal knowing that USP AP Standard 2-2(b) allows an "intended user" of an appraisal
report to be identified as type, and also allows the client to distribute the report at the
request of the borrower. As thoroughly indicated in the Plaintiffs Response to
Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and in the
Motion for Reconsideration, this language clearly creates a duty that Massey owes to any
foreseeable user of the appraisal. In fact, the language ofUSPAP Standard 2-2(b)
evidences that Idahy is a foreseeable user of Massey's appraisal.
A jury would have ample evidence to find that Idahy was an "intended user" of
Massey's appraisal. Further, it is obvious that the Defendants' owed a duty to Idahy as a
reasonably foreseeable user of the appraisal. The fact that this issue is not being allowed
to be submitted to the jury is erroneous.

III. THE COURT RELIES ON THE UNDOCUMENTED AFFIDAVIT OF ERNIE
MENCHACA

4
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In its Order, the Court bases its conclusion and decision upon the undocumented
Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca (hereinafter, the Menchaca Affidavit). The Order cites the
Menchaca Affidavit, and the defense has continued to rely on the alleged affidavit of
Menchaca throughout the proceedings.
On August 18th, 2010, the Defense submitted to the Court and Plaintiff a
Subpoena Duces Tecum, addressed to Clearwater Mortgage, Inc., c/o Ernie Menchaca.
(See, attached as Exhibit A.) However the Defense sent a Notice of Vacating Records
Deposition of Clearwater Mortgage, Inc. on August 25, 2010. (See, attached as Exhibit

Ji, hereinafter "Notice".) Written in accordance with Rule 11, the Notice continues,
"Defendants will reschedule the deposition for a later date and time." It is a fact that no
deposition of Menchaca was ever rescheduled by Defendants and no deposition of
Menchaca ever took place. In hindsight, it is clear why Defendants made such a
misrepresentation to Plaintiff.
In its Order, the Court addresses the fact that the Defendants relied on the
Menchaca Affidavit despite their failure to file the document as an Exhibit, or record in
the Register of Actions. (See, Order footnotes, Pg. 3). The Order states "At the hearing,
the court confirmed that Plaintiff had timely received service of copy of the Menchaca
Affidavit with the original motion papers and granted Defendants leave to file a copy
after the hearing". In fact, Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit.
Defendants filed a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit on February 9th, 2012, only 7 days
before the court issued its Order on Motions of Summary Judgment.
Defendants first relied on the alleged Menchaca Affidavit in their Motion for
Summary Judgment (See, page 3). However Defendants never provided the Affidavit to
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Plaintiffs, or to the Court. In a letter dated November 9, 2011, Defendants' Counsel
describes the exhibits included with their Motion for Summary Judgment (See, attached
as Exhibit C). The letter proves that Defendants withheld the production of the
Menchaca Affidavit from Plaintiff at that time.
The Defense also relies on the alleged Menchaca Affidavit in their Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Again, the Opposition failed to include any
exhibit or record as to the Menchaca Affidavit. The letter accompanying the Motion
from January 23, 2012 is evidence as such (See, attached Exhibit D). The letter proves
that again, for a second time, Defendants withheld production of the Menchaca Affidavit
from Plaintiff.
Despite never producing the Menchaca Affidavit, as required by the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Defense continued to rely on the alleged Menchaca Affidavit in
motions and proceedings. It is a fact that the Defense noticed Menchaca to be deposed.

It is also a fact that the Defense cancelled that deposition representing under Rule 11 that
it would be rescheduled. How Mr. Menchaca's Affidavit ended up in the following
proceedings is still up for question.

If the Court based its Order upon the undocumented

Affidavit of Menchaca, then it based its decision upon a document withheld from
Plaintiff and never allowed to be tested in the discovery process. Unfortunately, it
appears the court has assumed the Affidavit to be true and accurate, despite the fact that
the Affidavit is directly contradicted by the Certification made by Massey in his
Appraisal.
Regardless of what Mr. Menchaca said in his affidavit, it is an undisputed fact that
Wade Massey chose "Summary" appraisal on his certified appraisal form, fully knowing
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the obligations that the specific choice entailed. At minimum, there presently exists a
dispute, to be decided by a jury, as to whether Defendant's acceptance of payment
supports a conclusion that Idahy was an "intended user" of Defendants' Appraisal.

IV.

LEGALSTANDARD

As the Court is aware, the purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether
a trial is necessary. White v. Sort Intern Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10 1h Cir. 1995).
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thomson v. City of
Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50, P.3d 488, 491 (2002).
In this case, the Court's Order disregards that underlying facts are disputed and
that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Idahy was entitled to use and
rely upon the Appraisal after paying Defendants their fee for preparation of the Appraisal.
The undisputed facts are that Idahy tendered payment to the Defendants, the Defendants
accepted that payment, and the Defendants deposited that payment in their bank account.
Further, the Defendants knowingly and purposefully prepared the Appraisal as a
"Summary", thus creating a "reasonably foreseeable" plaintiff in Idahy. In light of these
facts, at a minimum, an obvious reasonable inference would be that the Credit Union
reasonably relied on an Appraisal for which it tendered payment.

V. CONCLUSION
The fact that Ernie Menchaca has not yet been deposed 1 and that Defendants
withheld production of his Affidavit to Plaintiff is of critical importance in this case.
Neither the Court nor the Plaintiff received notice of his Affidavit until the Court

1 The

discovery cut off is 45 days prior to the August 201h trial date.
7
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submitted it into the record on February 9, 2012. It is unfortunate that this was only 7
days before the Court filed its Order for Summary Judgment in the case.
The circumstances surrounding Ernie Menchaca's testimony in his Affidavit
create important questions regarding the adequacy of the statements he provided.
Importantly, it also creates doubts as to the key tenets of Defense's case, mainly the
scope and use of the appraisal agreement between Massey and Clearwater Mortgage. So
when the Court based its order off the alleged Menchaca Affidavit, it based its Order on
disputed facts.
The following facts are undisputed:
•

Massey accepted payment from Idahy for $800.00.

•

Payment was for the appraisal that Massey prepared.

•

In Massey's appraisal, he knowingly and purposefully selected a
"summary" appraisal, not a "restricted use" agreement.

•

Massey signed the appraisal.

•

Specific terms in the appraisal indicated that Massey could be held liable
to third parties under the agreement.

•

The appraisal was negligently prepared and Massey knew the appraisal
was "defective".

•

Idahy justifiably relied on the appraisal, and damages of $250,000
occurred due to the "defective" appraisal.

In light of these undisputed facts it is apparent that the Court was in error when
entering Summary Judgment on behalf of the Defendants. The undisputed facts as
mentioned above, logically undermine the assertions made by Defendants. It is apparent

8
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that Idahy was a foreseeable and intended user of Massey's appraisal. Further, by
accepting payment for his appraisal services, Massey voluntarily assumed a duty to
Plaintiff. As such, this is a case to be litigated in front of a jury.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court reconsider and
vacate its Order granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and allow this
Plaintiff to proceed to trial, allowing a jury to hold Massey liable for his "defective"
appraisal.

DATED this ~ay of April, 2012.
Respectfully submitted,
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC

CJ\l..i.\\ oP'N~ ~. \MC:.~
o'f"

W1l..S c:>i4 M c..C.c \ \,

~UL-~~~
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Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351
John J. Browder, ISB #7531
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, ID 83701-0856
Telephone: (208) 342-4300
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344
2700.024\SDT Clearwater Mortgage. wpd

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF'THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CVlO - 3993
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

vs.
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

THE STATE OF IDAHO TO:

Clearwater Mortgage, Inc.
c/o Ernie Menchaca
8517 W. Overland Road
Boise, ID 83709

YOU ARE COMMANDED:
[]

To appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify in the above case.

[ ]

To appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the taking of a
deposition in the above case.

[ X]

To produce or permit inspection and copying of the documents or objects attached

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM CLEARWATER MORTGAGE, INC. -1

hereto as Exhibit "A," including electronically stored information, at the place, date
and time specified below.
[ ]

To permit inspection of the following premises at the date and time specified below.

PLACE:

Lopez & Kelly, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Ste. 100
Boise, Idaho 83701-0856

DATE:

August 30, 2010

TIME:

9:30 a.m.

You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or to
produce or pennit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in contempt of
court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS
($100. 00) and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this Subpoena.
DATED this

I g day of August, 2010.
LOPEZ & KELLY PLLC

By:-jfil-/?-.f
?c.
Zh;iE. Kelly, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM CLEARWATER MORTGAGE, INC. -2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HE?~B Y CERTIFY that on this~ day of August, 2010, I served a true and correct copy
ofthe foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated
below, addressed as follows:
~·

Jeffrey M. Wilson
WILSON & MCCOLL
420 W. Washington
PO Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 345~9100
Facsimile: (20&) 384-0442
Attorney for Plaintiff
Patrick J. Collins
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC
1801 Broadway, Suite 1203
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 296-7700
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160
Attorney for Plaintiff

0
0
0

'

0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

~~~

~E.Kelly

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM CLEARWATER MORTGAGE, INC. -3

0249

EXHIBIT "A"
1.

Your entire file, documents and/or tangible objects whethe in electronic form or tangible

relating to Steven Hruza and Valerie H:ruza, including, without limitation, all emails,
correspondence, unden:vriting notes and applications for ioans to be secured by the real property
located at 16462 Plum Drive, Caldwell, Idaho 83607.

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM CLEARWATER MORTGAGE, INC. -4
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Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351
John J. Browder, ISB #7531
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, ID 83701-0856
Telephone: (208) 342-4300
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344
2700.024\Depo.Clearwater.vacatewpd.wpd

~ {(~}) 1~r-.._,\"\
n
11 \ \ , /

Attorneys for Defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CVlO - 3993

NOTICE OF VACATING RECORDS
DEPOSITION OF CLEARWATER
MORTGAGE, INC.

vs.
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record,
Lopez & Kelly, PLLC, hereby vacate the previously scheduled records deposition, set to commence on
August 30, 2010, at 9:30 a.m.
Defendants will reschedule the deposition for a later date and time.
DATED this

.2.£ day of August, 2010.
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC

ael E. Kelly, Of the Firm
ttorneys for Defendant Wade Massey

NOTICE OF VACATING RECORDS DE

~
!

EXHIBIT

ER MORTGAGE, INC.- 1

I'--~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _ day of August, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated below,
addressed as follows:
Jeffrey M. Wilson
WILSON & MCCOLL
420 W. Washington
PO Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-9100
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442
Attorney for Plaintiff
Patrick J. Collins
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC
700 17th St., Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 296-7700
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160
Attorney for Plaintiff

NOTICE OF VACATING RECORDS DEPOSITION OF

Ya0
0

4
0
0

CL~ARWATER
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U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

MORTGAGE, INC.-2

LOPEZ

& KELLY PLLC

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
WITH A ITORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO
OREGON, NEW YORK & ARIZONA
413 W. IDAHO STREET
SUITE 100
POBox856
BOISE, IDAHO 83701

THOMAS H. LOPEZ
MICHAELE. KELLY
Lou PICCIONI
JOHN J. BROWDER
NATHANS. OHLER

TELEPHONE (208) 342-4300
FACSIMILE (208) 342-4344

November 9, 2011

www.idahodefense.com

Clerk of the District Court
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605
RE:

Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey, et al.
Canyon County Case No. CVlO - 3993
Our File No. 2700.024

Dear Clerk:
Please find enclosed with this letter an original and one copy of the following:

I.
2.
3.
4.

5.

Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Motion for Summary Judgment;
Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment;
Affidavit of Wade Massey;
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals'
Motion for Summary Judgment; and
Notice of Hearing.

Please file the originals, conform the copies, and return the conformed copies to this office.
I have enclosed a self-addressed, postage prepaid envelope for your convenience.
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

/%7

~
mek@idahod%~~~com
Michael E./[

MEK/ts
Enclosures
c: Jeffrey M. Wilson, w/enclosure
Patrick J. Collins, w/enclosure
Clerk08. wpd

~
/;

l

EXHIBIT

LOPEZ

& KELLY PLLC

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
WITH ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO
OREGON, NEW YORK & ARIZONA

413 W. IDAHO STREET
SUITE 100
PO Box 856
BOISE, IDAHO 83701

THOMAS H. LOPEZ
MJCHAELE. KELLY

JOHN J. BROWDER
NATHANS. OHLER

TELEPHONE (208) 342-4300
FACSTh1ILE (208) 342-4344

January 23, 2012

www.idahodefense.com

Clerk of the District Court
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605
RE:

Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey, et al.
Canyon County Case No. CVIO - 3993
Our File No. 2700.024

Dear Clerk:
Please find enclosed with this letter an original and one copy of the following:
1.
2.
3.

Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment;
Affidavit of Joe Huffman; and
Second Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants Massey and Capitol West
Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Please file the originals, conform the copies, and return the conformed copies to this office.
I have enclosed a self-addressed, postage prepaid envelope for your convenience.
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

v;?~
Michael E. -

~

mek@idahod~~:~com

ME Kits
Enclosures
c: Jeffrey M. Wilson, w/enclosure
Patrick J. Collins, w/enclosure
Clerk09. wpd
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Jeffrey M. Wilson, #1615
Wilson & McColl
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200
Boise, ID 83703
'felephone; 208-345-9100
Patrick J Collins,# 13046
Collins & Coldwell, LLC
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820
Denver, CO B0202
Telephone: 303-296-7700

APR i 0
CANYON COUNTY
T. CRAWFORD,

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 1HE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR Tiffi COUNTY OF CANYON
INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,

vs.

Case No. CVI0-3993

VlADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
P..PPRA1SALS,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
COMES NOW Plaintiff CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc., by and through its counsel,
Collins & Coldwell, LLC, and hereby submits its Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for
Ri:conside:ra.tion.

TIIELAWSUJT
Plaintiff's cause of action is against a real estate appraiser and his employer. In its
Complaint, Plamti:ff alleges that the appraiser breached duties owed in providing services.
Plaintiff seeks damages for economic loss.

Defendants are accused of negligence in the

pr. ill. LVIL
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preparation of an A.ppraisal and for over~appraising a property by approximately one half million
aclfots. Defondant Wade Massey; under oathi has admitted to doing so and characterized his
appraisal as "defective.'' When the borrowers/property owners defaulted on their real estate-

secured loan with Plaintiffs subrogee, Icon Federal Credit Union, the property was not worth the
value of the mortgage kian and Icon Federal Credit Union suffered a $268,339.61 loss.
CONTROLLING LAW
1.

flRRBA

The applicable controlling law to our fact pattern is the Financial Institutions Reform)
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Title XI, 12 U.S.C. §3331> et seq. The
purpose of FIRREA is to ensure that real estate appraisals are conducted in accordance with
uni form standards,

These standards require that all appraisals be performed in writing by

individuals whose competency has been established and whose conduct will be supervised
effectively. FIR.REA established an Appraisal Standards Board to provide these guidelines,
which were then promulgated as the Unifonn Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice.
The Uniform Stai.1dards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP) guidelines are

published annually. The guidelines are divided into Definitions, Preamble, Rules, Standards and
Standards Rules (which include comments), and the Statements on Appraisal Standards. The
core principle embodied in USP Af' guidelines is found in Standards Rule

* *

1~1

is as follows:

-It

In developing a real property appraisal~ an appraiser must:
a)

be aware of, understand, a_nd correctly em.ploy those recognized methods and
techniques that are necessary to produce a credible appraisal;

2
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b)

not commit a substantial error of omission or commission that significantly
3.ffects an appraisal; and

c)

not render 'appraisal services in a careless or negligent manner, such as by making
a series of errors that, although individually might not significantly affect the
results of an appraisa1 1 in the aggregate affect the credibility of those results.

* * *

In Idaho, the Real Estate Appraisers Act (§54-4101) governs the administrative

regulation of all appraisers licensed in accordance \.Vith FIRREA. In Idaho, the Act includes the
term ''appraisal assignment," which is defined in §54-4101 as:
(2) "Appraisal assignment" means an engagement for which an appraiser
is employed or retained to act, or would be perceived by third parties or the
public as aeting, as a disinterested third party in rendering an unbiased opinion or
conclusion relating to the value, nature, quality or utility of specified interested in,
or aspect of} identified real estate. [Emphasis on third-party reliance added.]

\}/hile USPAP does not require that a real estate appraisal be perfect, it does establish a
standard that requires an appraiser to use diligence and due care in fonnulating a market
valuation and not render services in a careless or negligent manner. See Private Mortgage

Investment Services, Inc. v. Hotel & Club Associates, Inc., 296 F.3d 308, 315 (4th Cir. 2002) (it
is failure to exercise due care that allows for claim against real estate appraiser).
Numerous courts have upheld negligent misrepresentation and professional malpractice
claims against real estate appraisers in. connection with defective appraisals. For example,
appraiser liable to third party for negligent misrepresentation, Superior Bank, F.S.B. v. Tandem
National ivfortgage, 111c., 197 F.Supp.2d 298, 311 (D.Md. 2000); economic-loss doctrine did not
repurchaser's negligent misrepresentation claim against appraiser, First Federal Savings &

Loan Association of Rochester v. Charter Appraisal Co., 247 Conn. 597> 724 A.2d 497 (1999);
affirming fmding for plaintiff when appraiser overvalued real property and bank relied on
appraisal, Bolser v. Clark, 110 Wn.App. 895, 43 PJd 62; 65 (2002); Fisher v. Comer Plantation,

3
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Inc., 772 So.2d 455, 462 (Ala. 2000); Schaaf v. Highfield, 127 Wn.2d 17, 896 P.2d 665, 668-669
(1995); First State Savings Bank v. Albright & Associates of Ocala, Inc., 561 So.2d 1326, 1329
(Fla.App. 1990)i holding real estate appraiser may be liable to third parties for negligent

misrepresentation, overruled on other grounds by Garden v. Frier, 602 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 1992);

v. Neimon, 123 Wis.2d 410, 366 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Wis.App 1985); real estate appraiser
liable to third parties not in privity for negligent misrepresentation, Larsen v. United
Federal Savings & Loan Association ofDes Moines, 300 N. W.2d 281, 289 (Iowa 1981 ).

2.

DUTY TO EXERCISE ORDINARY CARE
As a general principle, every person, in the conduct of his or her business, has a duty to

exercise ordinary care to p:reveni unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others. Sharp v.
WH Moore inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d 506 (1990).
In determining whether a duty will arise in a particular context, the Idaho Supreme Court
has identified several factors to consider. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 985 P.2d 669

(1999). The factors include the foreseeability of hann to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that

the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
mJUJ7

the moral blarne attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing

future hann, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and

prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Id.; Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846, 908 P.2d
143, 148 (1995). Where the degree or result of hann is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a
l'e!arively kw; degree offoreseeabilit'; is required. Turpen, 985 P.2d at 673.

4
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RULE 56

The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c),
vrhich is identical in aJl relevant aspect to I.R.C.P. 56(c)> stated:
In our view, the plain language of

Rule 56(c) mandates the entcy of summary

judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's cse, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material
fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmovnillg party's case necessarily renders all other facts m-immaterial. The

moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" because the non.moving
party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case
·with respect to which she has the burden of proof.· [Emphasis added.]
Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 3171 322~23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265,

273 (1986) (cirations omitted). The language and reasoning in. Celotex has been adopted in
Idaho. Dunnickv. Elder, 126 Idaho 3081 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct App. 1994).

DATED frris f~dny of April, 2012.
Respectfully submitted,

COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC

A(!,{
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CANYON COUNTY 061,';RK
K CANO, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

CV-2010-3993-C

INTRODUCTION

In this action, Plaintiff asserts claims for professional negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, and breach of contract based upon Defendant's alleged negligence in
preparing an appraisal on certain real property located in Canyon County. Plaintiff alleges that
Idahy Federal Credit Union, now known as Icon Credit Union, relied on the appraisal in
approving a loan to Steven and Valerie Hruza secured by a second mortgage on the property.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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The factual allegations of the Complaint are set forth in the court's February 17, 2012
Order on Motions for Summary Judgment. In that Order, the court granted Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims for Negligent Misrepresentation and
Breach of Contract, based on the determination that such claims were not viable, as a matter of
law, based upon existing Idaho precedent and the facts alleged, and Plaintiffs Negligence
claim, based upon the absence of a duty, recognized by law, running from Defendants to
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration of the court's determination granting summary
judgment on its Negligence claim.
After reviewing the parties' submissions and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(D), the court
determines that it does not require oral argument to determine the issues raised on the instant
motion. Plaintiff does not rely on any new evidence in support of its motion, but, instead,
asserts that the court misapprehended or misapplied the applicable law in reaching its
determination.

I. Legal Standard
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory order of the trial court may be made at
any time before the entry of final judgment or within fourteen days after entry of judgment.
I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B).
The decision whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration generally rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court. Spur Products v. Stoel Rives, LLP, 143 Idaho 812, 815, 153
P.3d 1158, 1161 (2007). In making a discretionary determination, this court must: (1) correctly
perceive the issue as discretionary; (2) act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
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consistently with the applicable legal standards and choices available to the court; and (3) reach
its decision by an exercise ofreason. Id., 143 Idaho at 817, 153 P.3d at 1163.
II. Analysis

On its motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff asserts that the court erred in granting
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing its Negligence claim because: (1) "the
court has usurped the function of a jury by making factual findings in granting summary
judgment in favor of Defendants;" and (2) the "Court erroneously concludes that the standard
of care was not 1::-reached because the Appraisal was not a 'report' that Idahy FCU was
authorized to rely upon when making a mortgage loan to the Hruzas."
A. Duty

As the court explained in its Order, a party asserting a claim for negligence must prove:
( 1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of
conduct; (2) breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and
damage/injury to the plaintiff; and (4) actual loss or damage. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi
Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999).

The question of whether a duty exists is one oflaw. Id., 133 Idaho at 400, 987 P.2d at
312.
Plaintiff has not adduced any Idaho authority indicating that the above is an incorrect
statement of the applicable law.
After reviewing the evidence before it, the court determined that Defendants made a
primafacie showing that Defendants assumed no duty, recognized by law, to Plaintiff and that

Plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to demonstrate the existence of such a duty. Based on this
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determination, the court concluded that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Plaintiff's Negligence claim for lack of duty, recognized by law, running from
Defendants to Plaintiff. The court adheres to its determination, for the reasons set forth in the
Order.
In addition, in light of the fact that the question of the existence of a duty is a matter of
law for the court, it is unclear to the court how it usurped the function of a jury by determining
the issue of duty on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

B. Standard of Care
In light of its determination that there was no enforceable duty running from Defendants
to Plaintiffs, the court did not reach the issue of whether Defendants breached any potentially
applicable standard of care.

II. Menchaca Affidavit
In its Reply, Plaintiff contends that the court erred in relying on the Affidavit of Ernie
Menchaca in making its determination because, "[I]f the Court based its Order upon the
undocumented Affidavit of Menchaca, then it based its decision upon a document withheld from
Plaintiff and never allowed to be tested in the discovery process."
In a footnote to its Order, the court specifically noted: "In preparing for the hearing on
the instant motions, it became clear to the court that Defendants were relying on the Menchaca
Affidavit in support of their Motion. However, the court could not locate that Affidavit in the
file and there was no record of the Affidavit in the Register of Actions. At the hearing, the court
confirmed that Plaintiffs had timely received service of a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with
the original motion papers and granted Defendants leave to file a copy after the hearing.
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Defendants filed a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit on February 9, 2012." In its Reply, Plaintiff
asserts, that "in fact, Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit. Defendants filed
a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit on February 91h, 2012, only 7 days before the court issued its
Order on Motions for Summary Judgment." The author of Plaintiffs Reply 1 omits the fact that
the court raised this specific issue with counsel for both parties at the outset of the hearing,
Plaintiffs counsel specifically acknowledged receipt of the Menchaca Affidavit and graciously
stipulated to permit Defendants' counsel to augment the record to include the Menchaca
Affidavit. The court directed Defendants' counsel to file a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with
the court to ensure that it appeared in the court's records, because Defendants relied on the
Affidavit in different portions of the motions before the court. Defendants filed the Affidavit on
February 9, 2012, the same day as the hearing on the parties' motions. It is well-established in
this state that stipulations of parties or counsel made in pending proceedings are conclusive as to
all matters properly contained or included therein. See Workman Family Partnership v. City of
Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 35, 655 P.2d 926, 929 (1982).
To the extent Plaintiff asserts that it required additional time to secure evidence sufficient
to respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the proper course of action was to
make an application pursuant to I.R.C.P 56(f). Plaintiff failed to make such an application and
still has not made such an application.

1

It appears that Plaintiff's submissions on the instant motion, including the Reply, were not authored by counsel
who appeared on Plaintiffs behalf at the hearing on the motions for summary judgment.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/.n~

Dated this _j_/L_day of April, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the
following, either by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid; by hand delivery; by courthouse
basket; or by facsimile copy:

Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200
Boise, Idaho 83703
Facsimile: 208-384-0442
John J. Browder
Lopez & Kelly, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
P.O. Box 856
Boise, Idaho 83 70 I
Facsimile: 208-342-4344
Patrick J. Collins
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820
Denver, Colorado 80202
Facsimile: 303-295-7160

CHRIS YAMAMOTO
Clerk of the District Court
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RA~~SMISSIOH VERIFICATIOt-~

REPORT

TIME
~~AME

FAX

: 04/10/2012 15:03
: CA~.JYON COUNTY COURTS
: 2084547525

TEL
:
SER.#: 000L9J473711

04/10 15:00
93840442
00:02:47
07

DATE, TIME
FA>< HCI • / HAME

DIJPATIIJH
PA(:iE (S)
RE:3ULT

CIK

STANDARD
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CUMIS INSUIV\NCE SOCIETY, INC."
Plaintiff"
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,t..PPRAISALS,
Defendants.
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In this action, Plaintiff asserts claims for professional negligence, negligent

Jeffrey M. Wilson, #1615
Wilson & McColl
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200
Boise, ID 83703
Telephone: 208-345-9100
Patrick J. Collins, #13046
Collins & Coldwell, LLC
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: 303-296-7700
Attorneys for Plcfatiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. CVl0-3993

vs.
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

MOTION TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(f) AND RENEWED MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE
COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
NOW COMES Plaintiff, CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc., by and through its undersigned
counsel, requests that this honorable Court permit the taking of the deposition of Ernie Menchaca
pursuant to Rule 56(f). In support thereof, Plaintiff asserts as follows:
1.

On February 16, 2012, this Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment and entered an Order dismissing Plaintiffs claims.

0 2'7

2.

On March 15, 2012, this Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants and

dismissed with prejudice all claims against Defendants. The Court also agreed to consider the
issue of costs and attorney fees pursuant to Rule 54 and a hearing is currently set for May 10,
2012.
3.

The Court, on April 10, 2012, entered an Order summarily denying Plaintiffs

Motion for Reconsideration without a hearing that was scheduled for April 11, 2012.

The

Court's Order stated:
II.

Menchaca Affidavit

In its Reply, Plaintiff contents that the court erred in relying on the
Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca in making its determination because, "[I]f the Court
based its Order upon the undocumented Affidavit of Menchaca, then it based its
decision upon a document withheld from Plaintiff and never allowed to be tested
in the discovery process."
In a footnote to its Order, the Court specifically noted: "In preparing for
the hearing on the instant Motions, it became clear to the Court that Defendants
were relying on the Menchaca Affidavit in support of their Motion. However, the
Court could not locate that Affidavit in the file and there was no record of the
Affidavit in the Register of Actions. At the hearing, the Court confirmed that
Plaintiff had timely received service of a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with the
original Motion papers and granted Defendants leave to file a copy after the
hearing. Defendants filed a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit on February 9,
2012." In its Reply, Plaintiff asserts that "in fact, Plaintiff did not receive a copy
of the Menchaca Affidavit. Defendants filed a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit on
February 9, 2012, only seven days before the Court issued its Order on Motions
for Summary Judgment." The author of Plaintiffs Reply 1omits the fact that the
Court raised this specific issued with counsel for both parties at the outset of the
hearing. Plaintiffs counsel specifically acknowledged receipt of the Menchaca
Affidavit and graciously stipulated to permit Defendants' counsel to augment the
record to include the Menchaca Affidavit. The Court directed Defendants'
counsel to file a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with the Court to ensure that it
appeared in the Court's records, because Defendants relied on the Affidavit in
different portions of the Motions before the Court. Defendants filed the Affidavit
on February 9, 2012, the same day as the hearing on the parties' Motions. It is
well established in this State that stipulations of parties or counsel made in
pending proceedings are conclusive as to all matters properly contained or
1

It appears that Plaintiffs submission on the instant Motion, including the Reply, were not authored by counsel who
appeared on Plaintiffs behalf at the hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment.
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included therein. See Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104
Idaho 32, 35, 655 P.2d 926, 929 (1982).
To the extent Plaintiff asserts that it required additional time to secure
evidence sufficient to respond to Defendants' Motion for Summa.Ty Judgment, the
proper course of action was to make an application pursuant to IR.C.P. 56(f).
Plaintiff failed to make such an application and still has not made such an
application.
4.

The Court was correct in finding that Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the

Menchaca Affidavit and that I.R.C.P. 56(f) specifically provides that the Court can deny a
summary judgment or grant a continuance to permit the taking of a deposition. Rule 56(£) states:
When affidavits·are unavailable in summary judgment proceedings.
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.

5.

The Court's Order is incorrect in the statement that counsel at the hearing

"acknowledge receipt of the Menchaca Affidavit." In fact, no counsel for Plaintiff as of this date
has received a copy of the Affidavit (see Affidavits of Patrick J. Collins and Jeffrey M. Wilson,
attached hereto as Exhibits A and B, respectively).
6.

In its Order, the Court bases its conclusion and decision upon the undocumented

Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca. The Order cites the Menchaca Affidavit and the defense has
continued to rely on the alleged Affidavit of Menchaca even though it has never been provided to
opposing counsel.
7.

On August 18, 2010, the defense submitted to the Court and Plaintiff a Subpoena

Duces Tecum addressed to Clearwater Mortgage, Inc., c/o Ernie Menchaca (see attached
Exhibit C). However, the defense sent a Notice of Vacating Records Deposition of Clearwater

Mortgage, Inc. on August 25, 2010 (see attached Exhibit D, hereinafter, "Notice"). Written in

3
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accordance with Rule 11, the Notice continues, "Defendants will reschedule the deposition for a
later date and time."

It is a fact that no deposition of Menchaca was ever rescheduled by

Defendants and no deposition of Menchaca ever took place. Instead, Defendants relied upon use
of an ex parte affidavit at the summary judgment hearing.
8.

In its Order, the Court addresses the fact that the Defendants relied on the

Menchaca Affidavit despite their failure to file the document as an exhibit or record it in the
Register of Actions (see Order footnotes, pg. 3). The Order states, "At the hearing, the Court
confirmed that Plaintiff had timely received service of [a] copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with
the original Motion papers and granted Defendants leave to file a copy after the hearing." In
fact, Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit.
9.

Defendants first relied on the alleged Menchaca Affidavit in their Motion for

Summary Judgment (see pg. 3).

However, the Defendants never provided the Menchaca

Affidavit to Plaintiff or to the Court. In a letter, dated November 9, 2011, Defendants' counsel
describes the Exhibits included with their Motion for Summary Judgment (see attached Exhibit
E). The letter proves that Defendants failed to produce or deliver the Menchaca Affidavit from
Plaintiff at that time.
10.

The defense also relied on the Menchaca Affidavit in their Opposition to

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Again, the Opposition failed to include the Affidavit
as an exhibit or make it part of the record. The letter accompanying the Motion from January 23,
2012 is evidence as such (see attached Exhibit F). The letter provides that again, for a second
time, Defendants failed to produce or deliver the Menchaca Affidavit from Plaintiff at that time.
11.

Regardless of what Mr. Menchaca stated in his Affidavit, it is an undisputed fact

that Wade Massey chose "Summary" appraisal on his certified Appraisal form, fully knowing the

4

obligations that the specific choice entailed. At minimum, there presently exists a dispute to be
decided by a jury as to whether Defendants' acceptance of payment supports a conclusion that
Idahy was an "intended user" of Defendants' Appraisal.
12.

The discovery cut off date is 45 days prior to the August 20th trial date and there

is ample time to complete discovery if the Court permits the deposition and stays the entry of
judgment. The circumstances surrounding Ernie Menchaca's testimony in his Affidavit create
important questions regarding the adequacy of the statements he provided. Importantly, it also
creates doubts as to the key tenets of the defense's case, mainly the scope and use of the appraisal
agreement between Massey and Clearwater Mortgage.
Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court stay the Judgment in this case,
permit the deposition of Ernie Menchaca, and reconsider and vacate its Order granting
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and allow this Plaintiff to proceed to trial, allowing
a jury to determine whether Massey is liable for his admittedly "defective" Appraisal.
DATED this

_/j_ day of April, 2012.

Respectfully submitted,
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC

5
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned.hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION

TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO
RULE 56(f) AND RENEWED MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT'S ORDER
GRANTING SUMMARY JTJDGMENT has been tra.11smitted as indicated below this
day

ti

of April, 2012, to the following:
Michael E. Kelly
John J. Browder
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
P.O. Box 856

B~ise, IP~ 701 j
,
Via: --~__ .M,,o;j
I
Jeffrey M. Wilson, #1615
Wilson & McColl
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200

7

'}

B~ise, #ID
370 ~
Via: c_fi,.,tU,_
J
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Jeffrey M. Wilson, #1615
Wilson & McColl
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200
Boise, ID 83703
Telephone: 208-345-9100
Patrick J. Collins, #13046
Collins & Coldwell, LLC
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: 303-296-7700
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. CVI0-3993
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICK J. COLLINS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO
RULE 56(f) AND RECONSIDER THE COURT'S ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PATRICK J. COLLINS, being first duly sworn under oath, states as follows:
1. That I am one of the Counsel for Plaintiff.
2. That I make this Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Permit the
Taking of Ernie Menchaca' s Depostion Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and to Reconsider the
Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment.
3. That I make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge and review.

1
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4. That attached to this Affidavit and marked as Exhibit "A" and "B" are copies
of correspondence from Defense Counsel to the Clerk of the District Court of Canyon
County, dated November 9, 2011, and November 23, 2011. Neither Exhibits, "A" or
"B", make referenc~ to an Affidavit, specifically "The Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca".

5. That based on personal knowledge and review, Affiant, did not receive a copy
of the Menchaca Affidavit, and still does not have a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit as of
today's date.
6. Plaintiffs counsel disagrees with the Court's assertion in its Order granting
Defendants' request for Summary Judgment, which stated, "At the hearing, the Court
confirmed that Plaintiff had timely received service of copy of the Menchaca Affidavit
with the original Motion papers ... "
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this~ day of April, 2012.

J. Collins, #13046
STATE OF COLORADO
COUNTY OF DENVER

)
)ss
)
~~

.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this R d a y of April, 2011.
WITNESS my hand and official seal.
My Commission Expires:

{SEAL}

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of April, 2012, I mailed and faxed a
true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICK C. COLLINS IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION by regular United States mail with
correct postage affixed thereon addressed to:
John J. Browder
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile: 208-342-4344
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LOPEZ & KELLY PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
WITH ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO
OREGON, NEW YORK & ARIZONA
THOMAS

413 W. IDAHO STREET
SUITE 100
PO Box 856
BOISE, IDAHO 83701

H. LOPEZ

MICHAELE. KELLY
Lou PICCIONI
JOHN J. BROWDER
NATHANS. OHLER

TELEPHONE (208} 342-4300
FACSIMILE (208) 342-4344

November 9, 2011

www.idahodefense.com

Clerk of the District Court
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605
RE:

Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey, et al.
Canyon County Case No. CVIO - 3993
Our File No. 2700.024

Dear Clerk:·
Please find enclosed with this letter an original and one copy of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Motion for Summary Judgment;
Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment;
Affidavit of Wade Massey;
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals'
Motion for Summary Judgment; and
Notice of Hearing.

Please file the originals, conform the copies, and return the conformed copies to this office.
I have enclosed a self-addressed, postage prepaid envelope for your convenience.
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

/);l~

MichaelE.-'!

mek@idahodi~:1:.com

ME.Kits
Enclosures
c: Jeffrey M. Wilson, w/enclosure
Patrick J. Collins, w/enclosure
Clerk08. wpd

EXHIBIT

A

LOPEZ & KELLY PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
WITH ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO
OREGON, NEW YORK & ARIZONA

413 W. IDAHO STREET
SUITE 100

THOMAS H. LOPEZ
MICHAELE. KELLY
JOHN J. BROWDER
NATHANS. OHLER

PO Box 856
BOISE, IDAHO 83701
TELEPHONE (208) 342-4300
FACSIMILE (208) 342-4344

January 23, 2012

www.idahodefense.com

Clerk of the District Court
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605

RE:

Cum.is Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey, et al.
Canyon County Case No. CVIO - 3993
Our File No. 2700.024

Dear Clerk:
Please find enclosed with this letter an original and one copy of the following:

1.
2.
3.

Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment;
Affidavit of Joe Huffman; and
Second Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants Massey and Capitol West
Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Please file the originals, conform the copies, and return the conformed copies to this office.
I have enclosed a self-addressed, postage prepaid envelope for your convenience.
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

VA/~
Michael E.-

~

mek@idahodle~~~com

MEK/ts
Enclosures
c: Jeffrey M. Wilson, w/enclosure
Patrick J. Collins, w/enclosure
Clerk09.wpd

~

EXHIBIT

I.

B
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JEFFREY M. WILSON, ISB No. 1615
CHRISTOPHER R. MOORE, ISB No. 8772
WILSON & MCCOLL
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200
Boise, Idaho 83 703
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: 208-345-9100
Facsimile: 208-384-0442
PATRICK J. COLLINS, Atty. Reg. No. 13046
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820
Denver, CO. 80202
Telephone: 303-296-7700
Facsimile: 303-295-7160
Attorneys for Plaintiff CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AN FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.

)

CASE NO. CVlO - 3993

)

Plaintiff,
VS..

)
)

WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY M. WILSON
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PERMIT
THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA
DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO RULE
56(f) AND RECONSIDER THE COURT'S
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)

STATE OF IDAHO, )
: SS.

County of Ada.

)

JEFFREY M. WILSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

That I am one of the Counsel for Plaintiff.

2.

That I make this Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Permit the Taking of Ernie

AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY M. WILSON IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F) AND TO RECONSIDER THE
COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

0281.

Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(£) and to Reconsider the Comi's Order Granting
Summary Judgment.
3.

That I make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge.

4.

That attached to this Affidavit and marked as Exhibit "A" and "B" are copies of

correspondence from Defense Counsel to the Clerk of the District Court of Canyon County, dated
November 9, 2011, and November 23, 2011. Neither Exhibits, "A" or "B", make reference to an
Affidavit, specifically "The Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca".
5.

That your Affiant is aware of the Courts Order on Motions for Summary Judgment where

it states in footnote one (1) at page three (3) "At the hearing the Court confinned that Plaintiffs had
timely received service of the copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with the original Motion papers, and
granted Defendants leave to file a copy after the hearing". While your Affiant agreed to allow
Defense Counsel to file a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with the Court, your Affiant was mistaken,
and was not aware that neither your Affiant' s office nor the office of Co-Counsel had received a copy
of the Ernie Menchaca Affidavit at the time Defendant filed his Motion for Summary Judgment.
6.

That I have thoroughly reviewed my file materials, kept and maintained in my office in

conjunction with this case, and do not have a copy of the Ernie Menchaca Affidavit as of the date of
this Affidavit.
7.

That given the Courts reliance in part upon the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca in making its

rnling upon the Motions for Summary Judgment, it would appear appropriate to allow Plaintiff an
opportunity to respond to its contents.

AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY M. WILSON IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F) AND TO RECONSIDER THE
COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY illDGMENT - 2

00028

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this

J_g day of April, 2012.

John J. Browder
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile: 208-342-4344
Patrick J. Collins
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820
Denver, Colorado 80202
Facsimile: 303-295-7160

AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY M. WILSON IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F) AND TO RECONSIDER THE
COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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LOPEZ & KELLY PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
WITH ATTOJU-IEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO
OREGON, NEW YORK & ARIZONA

413 W. IDAHO STREET
SUITE 100
PO Box 856
BOISE, IDAHO 83701

THOMAS H. LOPEZ
MICHAELE. KELLY
Lou PICCIONI
JOHN J. BROWDER
NATHANS. OHLER

TELEPHONE (208) 342-4300
FACSIMILE (208) 342-4344

November 9, 2011

www.idahodefense.com

Clerk of the District Court
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605
RE:

Cuniis Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey, et al.
Canyon County Case No. CVIO - 3993
Our File No. 2700.024

Dear Clerk:
Please find enclosed with this letter an original and one copy of the following:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Motion for Summary Judgment;
Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment;
Affidavit of Wade Massey;
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals'
Motion for Summary Judgment; and
Notice of Hearing.

Please file the originals, conform the copies, and return the conformed copies to this office.
I have enclosed a self-addressed, postage prepaid envelope for your convenience.
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

/)ii;

Michael

E./~

mek@idahod%~~7com

ME Kits
Enclosures
c: Jeffrey M. Wilson, w/enclosure
Patrick J. Collins, w/enclosure
Clerk08.wpd
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LOPEZ & KELLY PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
WITH ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO
OREGON, NEW YORK & ARIZONA

413 W. IDAHO STREET
SUITE 100
PO Box 856
BOISE, IDAHO 83701

THOMAS H. LOPEZ
MICHAELE. KELLY
JOHN J. BROWDER
NATHANS. OHLER

TELEPHONE (208) 342-4300
FACSIMILE (208) 342-4344

January 23, 2012

www.idahodefense.com

Clerk of the District Court
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605
RE:

Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey, et al.
Canyon County Case No. CVIO - 3993
Our File No. 2700.024

Dear Clerk:
Please find enclosed with this letter an original ai1d one copy of the following:
1.
2.
3.

Defendants Massey and Capitol West Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment;
Affidavit of Joe Huffman; and
Second Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants Massey and Capitol West
Appraisals' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Please file the originals, conform the copies, and return the conformed copies to this office.
I have enclosed a self-addressed, postage prepaid envelope for your convenience.
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

v;?~
Michael E. :r(en y
mek@idahodlfense.com

ME Kits
Enclosures
c: Jeff~ey M. Wiluv.n.-µr~qJ.<elpsm:e
Patnck J. CollM~vfenctcb.:M ·
Clerk09.wpd

RECEIVED

JAN ? iii 2~IJ.Z
,,
1
W!Lsorv & Mr-r'"'
·.1
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(

I

,

Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351
John J. Browder, ISB #7531
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, ID 83701-0856
Telephone: (208) 342-4300
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344
2700.024\Aff of Counsel in Supp of Opposition to Motion to Permit Depo & Renewed Mot to Reconsider.wpd

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
VS.

WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

Case No. CVlO - 3993
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS
MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE
MENCHACA DEPOSITION
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F) AND
RENEWED MOTION TO
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)
: SS.

County of Ada

)

I, Michael E. Kelly, being first sworn, do hereby depose and state as follows:
1.

That I am a member of the firm Lopez & Kelly, PLLC, and one of the attorneys representing

Defendants WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST APPRAISALS in the above-captioned lawsuit. As
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S OPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F)
AND RENEWED MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I

such, I am familiar with the facts and circumstances of this case and make this affidavit based upon my
own personal knowledge;
2.

That attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Defendants' Answers to

Plaintiff's First Set oflnterrogatories.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.
DATED this _ \ day of May, 2012.
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC

By:~--~~---~~~~~~~

Michael E. K Ily, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants

fzst day of May, 2012.
~A.Q.~1~S[Q1/1yUJ~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me a notary public t.his

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at: Boise, ID
My Commission Expires:

~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this_\_ day of May, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated below,
addressed as follows:
Jeffrey M. Wilson
WILSON & MCCOLL
420 W. Washington
PO Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-9100
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442
Attorney for Plaintiff
Patrick J. Collins
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC
700 17th St., Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 296-7700
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160
Attorney for Plaintiff

~
D
D

g
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

MichaeIR illy

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S OPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F)
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Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351
John J. Browder, ISB #7531
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, ID 83701-0856
Telephone: (208) 342-4300
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344
2700.024\Ans. to Rogs.wpd.

LJ (

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
Case No. CVlO - 3993

CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES

vs.
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Lopez & Kelly, PLLC,
and answers Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories as follows:

INTERROGATORY NO. 1: State the name, address and telephone number of all
employees and/or agents involved in the transactions and events which are the subject matter of the
pleadings or who may have know ledge of the facts relevant to this lawsuit.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1:
· The Defendants object to this Interrogatory because it is vague and ambiguous as to the

DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES-I
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meaning of "employees and/or agents" and "transactions and events which are the subject matter of
the pleadings." Without waiving these objections, the Defendants state that, Defendant Wade
Massey, a member of Capitol West Appraisals, LLC, is the "employee/agent" who prepared the
appraisal that is at least in part, relevant to this lawsuit. Additionally, Shannon Polfer an independent
contractor who handles the bookkeeping for Capitol West Appraisals, LLC was also "involved" as
she handled receipt of the $800.00 check from Idahy and deposited it into the Capitol West
Appraisals, LLC's bank account.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify all persons responsible for furnishing any materials
or information used to complete these Interrogatories.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2:
Wade Massey
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State the name, address and telephone number of all persons
who you believe may have knowledge or relevant information concerning each claim or defense
disclosed in the Complaint and Answer.
ANSvVER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3:
The Defendants identify the following individuals without limitation:
( 1) Ethan Morris - former branch Vice President of Member Services for Idahy Credit Union
n/k/a Icon Credit Union ("Idahy").
(2) Dan Barger - former mortgage loan officer for Idahy.
(3) Connie Miller - current President and CEO of Icon Credit Union.
(4) Debbie Browning - Vice President of Icon Credit Union.
(5) Steven L. Hruza and Valerie J. Hruza ("Hruzas") - borrowers on the $250,000 home
equity loan.
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES-2
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(6) WadeMassey-appraiserwho appraised 16462PlumAve., Caldwell, ID 83607 ("Subject
Property").
(7) Shannon Polfer - as identified above.

(8) Jacob Wilson - Former mortgage loan officer for Clearwater Mortgage
(9) Ernie Menchaka-Former President of Clearwater Mortgage
( 10) Diane Leigh - Senior Recovery Specialist for the Plaintiff assigned to subject claim.
(11) AJ. Stover - Vice-President of Lending at Icon Credit Union
(12) Individuals identified in the parties' discovery responses. See Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 33(c)(stating that it is sufficient to specify the records from which the answer to an
interrogatory may be derived when "the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially
the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party served").
(13) Any expert disclosed by the parties.
Discovery is ongoing and, as a result, the parties may discover the identities of additional
individuals who may have knowledge or relevant information about the claims and defenses
disclosed in the Complaint and Answer.

INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify and list each document you believe may be relevant
to each separate claim or defense disclosed in the Complaint and Answer. As to each of the
documents identified, please provide the following:
a. The location of the document(s).
b. The name, address, and telephone number of the individual with custody or control over
the document(s).

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4:
The Defendants object to this InteITogatory because and to the extent it seeks information,
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES-3

documents, or communications protected by attorney-client privilege, confidentiality, work product
doctrines, and I.RE. 502.

Without waiving these objections, the Defendants answer this

Interrogatory as follows: because the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially
the same for the Plaintiff as for the answering Defendants, see Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 33(c ),
they refer the Plaintiff to the parties' discovery answers and responses, any supplements thereto and
the pleadings or papers filed in this matter.

INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please explain why the Uniform Residential Appraisal Report
prepared by Defendants appraising 16462 Plum Rd, Caldwell, ID. 83607 owned by Valerie Hruza,
having an effective appraisal date of 6/13/2007 (the "Appraisal") uses a Neighborhood Description
and the Neighborhood Boundaries for the city of Parma, Idaho when the Subject Property is located
in the Neighborhood named Caldwell, Idaho.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5:
The use of the description neighborhood boundaries for the City of Parma, Idaho on the
appraisal form was a mistake. It was one of the corrections to be made by the Defendants on the
appraisal prior to being advised by Clearwater Mortgage that it had no intention of utilizing the
appraisal due to the fact that the applicants, Steven and Valerie Hruza had already been declined for
various reasons, including insufficient credit. It is also noted that the appraisal does identify the
Hruza property as being located in Caldwell, Idaho.

INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify by street number, street name, and city and state
location the 50+ year old real property listed in the One Unit Housing column in the "Neighborhood"
section on page I of 6 in the Appraisal which sold for the high price of $1.5 million.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6:
This answering Defendant objects to this Interrogatory as it is misleading and unanswerable
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES-4
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as stated. Without waiving said objection, there is no representation in the appraisal of any such sale
referenced in Interrogatory No. 6.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please explain why none of COMPARABLE SALE #1

through and including COMPARABLE SALE #6 listed in the Appraisal beginning on page 2 of 6
and continuing on an unnumbered page represents an actual closed sale that occurred within the 12
month period preceding June 13, 2007.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

These answering Defendants object to this Interrogatory as Plaintiff misreads the appraisal
and as such, the interrogatory is unanswerable. ·without waiving said objection, statements
contained in Interrogatory No. 7 are incorrect.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please explain why Defendants did not use as a

COMPARABLE SALE any of the six closed sales mentioned on Appraisal page 1 of 6 in the
"Neighborhood" section, which states: "In the last 6 months for homes with below grade footage
4000-5300 sq. ft. homes in the 1292 and 1290, 0900 and 0950 MLS area, there have been 6 closed
sales .... "
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

These answering Defendants object to this Interrogatory as Plaintiff misreads the appraisal
and as such, the interrogatory is unanswerable.

Without waiving said objection, statements

contained in Interrogatory No. 8 are incorrect.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please identify by street number, street name, city and state

and by MLS Area number, all 6 of the comparable properties "currently offered for sale in the
subject neighborhood ranging in price from $599,900 to $995,900" that are mentioned in the first
line at the top of Appraisal page 2 of 6.
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OFINTERROGATORIES-5
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9:
These answering Defendants object to this Interrogatory as Plaintiff misreads the appraisal
and as such, the interrogatory is unanswerable. Without waiving said objection, these Defendants
indicate that the properties in this section of the appraisal were incorrectly identified and were in the
process of being edited when the report was canceled by the client, Clearwater Mortgage due to the
fact that the Hruza application had been turned down prior to any review of said appraisal.

INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please identify by street number, street name, city and state,
and by MLS Area number, all 8 of the comparable sales "in the subject neighborhood within the past
twelve months ranging in sale price from $580,000 to $985,000" that are mentioned in the 2nct line
down from the top of Appraisal page 2 of 6.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10:
These answering Defendants object to this Interrogatory as Plaintiff misreads the appraisal
and as such, the interrogatory is unanswerable. Without waiving said objection, these Defendants
indicate that the properties in this section of the appraisal were incorrectly identified and were in the
process of being edited when the report was canceled by the client, Clearwater Mortgage due to the
fact that the Hruza application had been turned down prior to any review of said appraisal.

INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please identify all the market factors which caused the
subject property at 16462 Plum Rd., Caldwell, ID. to increase in value from an actual sales price of
$740,000 on 11/10/2005 to an appraised Indicated Value by Sales Comparison Approach of
$1,150,000 as of 6/13/2007, as shown in Appraisal page 2 of 6.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11:
These answering Defendants object to this Interrogatory as Plaintiff misreads the appraisal
and as such, the interrogatory is unanswerable. Without waiving said objection, these answering

DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES-6
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Defendants direct Plaintiff to the explanation of market factors under analysis of prior sale section,
page 2 of 6 of the appraisal.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify the MLS Area number for the subject property at
16462 Plum Rd., Caldwell, ID.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12:
1290.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Identify the MLS Area number for the Neighborhood
actually used in the Neighborhood section on Appraisal page 1 of 6.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13:
1292.
INTERROGATORY N0.14: Please explain why the "Opinion of Site Value" in the Cost
Approach section on page 3 of 6 in the Appraisal values the subject property land at $86,657 ,37 per
acre($430,000 divided by 5 .02 acres) whereas the Value Adjustments made to the "Site" component
of COMPARABLE SALES #1, #2, #3, #4, #5 AND #6 in the Sales Comparison Approach section
for each such COMPARABLE SALE values the COMPARABLE SALE land at only $10,000 per
acre.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14:
These

answ~ring

Defendants object to this Interrogatory as Plaintiff misreads the appraisal

and as such, the interrogatory is unanswerable. Without waiving said objection, these answering
Defendants base values in this section of appraisal on the contributory value of the property as
reflected under the "cost to purchase option" on page 3 of 6 of the appraisal. Defendant otherwise
states that the appraisal speaks for itself.

000296

DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES-7

DATED this

f

day of December, 2010.
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC

By:

)'/~

Michael E. Ke,lly, Of the Firm
Attorneys for befendant Wade Massey
CERTJFICYE OF SERV1CE

~day

of December, 2010, I served a true and correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:
Jeffrey M. Wilson
WILSON & MCCOLL
420 W. Washington
PO Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-9100
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442
Attorney for Plaintiff

!@
0
0

ff

Patrick J. Collins
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC
700 17th St., Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 296-7700
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160
Attorney for Plaintiff

0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

Michael E. rlly
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VERIFICATION

STA TE OF IDAHO

)
:ss.

County of Ada

)

Wade !V1:1ssey, after first being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that he has read the
foregoing answers to Plaintiffs First Set ofinteITogatories and believe the same are true to the best
of his knowledge.

wade Massey

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

(].,l!~ay of November, 2010.
"'

\J(QA~~
Notary Public; tate of Idah9 A/7
Residing at 1/3lll~
My Commission expires
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Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351
John J. Browder, ISB #7531
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, ID 83701-0856
Telephone: (208) 342-4300
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344
2 700.024\0pposition56(f)Motion. wpd

Attorneys for Defendants

JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CUMIS JNSURANCE SOCIETY, JNC.,
Plaintiff,

vs.
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

Case No. CVlO - 3993

DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND
CAPITOL WEST'S OPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO PERMIT THE
TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA
DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO RULE
56(f) AND RENEWED MOTION TO
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

By and through undersigned counsel, Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals
(sometimes hereinafter "Defendants" or "Massey") file their Oppositi'on to Motion to Permit the Taking
of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's
Order Granting Summary Judgment ("Opposition").

DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO PERMIT THE TAKING
OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO RULE 56(f) AND RENEWED MOTION TO
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

I.
INTRODUCTION
In its Motion to Permit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and
Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment ("Motion"), Cumis moves
the Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(f) to take the deposition of Ernie Menchaca. Cumis also requests the
Court to reconsider, for the second time, its February 16, 2012, Order granting Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment.
The Court should deny Cumis's motion in their entirety. Cumis's Response to the Motion for
Summary Judgment was filed months ago, on January 13, 2012. At that time, Cumis did not seek relief
under I.R.C.P. 56(f) despite the fact Massey's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
filed on November 10, 2011, referred to the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca fourteen times. Since then, the
Court granted Massey's Motion for Summary Judgment and entered a Judgment on March 16, 2012.
Therefore, seeking relief under I.R.C.P. 56(f) is untimely and unwarranted, as there is no pending motion
for summary judgment proceeding to oppose. The renewed motion to reconsider the Court's Order
Granting Summary Judgment is also untimely under I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B). In addition to being untimely
in its present form, the Motion is also merely a rehashing of Plaintiffs previous arguments and presents
no new factual evidence or novel legal basis. It is representative of the Plaintiff's continued harassment
of the Court to accept its tortured spin on the pending action.

DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO PERMIT THE TAKING
OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO RULE 56(t) AND RENEWED MOTION TO
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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II.
RESPONSE
A.

The Court Should Deny Cumis's Motion to Permit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca's
Deposition.

I.R.C.P. 56(f) permits a court to order a continuance of summary judgment proceedings "should
it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present
by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition .... " 'Here, Cumis already has opposed
Massey's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court already has granted Massey's Motion for Summary
Judgment. And the Court already has entered a final Judgment. Afortiori, there is no longer a summary
judgment proceeding for which to seek a continuance. See I.R.C.P. 56(f).
Even if these fatal procedural pitfalls did not exist, Cumis has failed to adequately explain why it
did not request 56(f) r~lief when it was opposing Massey's Motion for Summary Judgment and there was
a proceeding to continue. Assuming for the sake of the argument that both of Cumis' s attorneys did not
receive Ernie Menchaca' s affidavit, 1 the alleged need to take Mr. Menchaca' s deposition existed with as
much force when Cumis was preparing its opposition as it would at this time. Undeniably, Cumis knew
or should have known that Massey could, and, in fact, was relying on Mr. Menchaca. First, Massey
identified Ernie Menchaca as an individual with potential relevant knowledge in Defendants' December
8, 2010 Answers to Plaintiff's First Set oflnterrogatories. 2 (See Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's First

1

As the Court has observed, stipulations in open proceedings are final. See Workman
Fmnily Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 35, 655 P.2d 926, 929 (1982).
Cumis' s counsel seemingly tries to disparage ~,.1assey' s counsel by describing the
Menchaca affidavit as "ex parte" The argument hardly merits a response. Suffice it say, there is
nothing improper about tracking down and interviewing potential witnesses. The concept of "ex
parte" does not apply to such actions, and Cumis' s characterization as such is ponderous, off
point and improper. If counsel is arguing that the Affidavit of Mr. Menchaca was filed with the
2
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Set oflnterrogatories, Answer No. 3(9) attached as Exhibit A, to the Affidavit of Counsel filed in Support
of Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion). Second, Massey's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment refers to the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca fourteen (14) times. Massey also relied on Mr.
Menchaca' s affidavit three (3) times in its Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and
one (1) time in its Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment. Similarly, Massey's
expert, Joe Huffman, relied on it in formulating his affidavit. But despite Massey's frequent written
reliance on Menchaca' s affidavit, none of Cumis' s multiple attorneys ever advised Massey's counsel that
it did not receive Menchaca's Affidavit.3 Nor did Cumis at that time move the Court for relief under
I.R.C.P. 56(f). Simply put, if Menchaca's deposition is "essential" now to justify Cumis's opposition, it
was even more "essential" then. See I.R.C.P. 56(f). Further, Cumis has offered no plausible reason why
it could not have deposed Menchaca sometime before Massey's summary judgment was filed, was heard,
or before the Court entered Judgment in its favor.
B.

The Court Should Deny Cumis's Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order
Granting Summary Judgment.

Motions for reconsideration are governed by I.R.C.P l l(a)(2)(B), which states:
(B) Motion For Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders
of the District Court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not
later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment. A motion for
reconsideration of any order of the District Court made after entry of final judgment may
be filed within fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order; provided, there shall be no

Court "ex parte", it was filed with the Court Clerk immediately following argument on the
summary judgment motions. Plaintiff's counsel was not provided a copy of the Affidavit at that
time based on the in Court presentation by counsel that Plaintiff had received the Affidavit, and
the Court's statement that it had not.
3

Despite the numerous references to the Menchaca Affidavit by Massey, at no point
during the Summary Judgment briefing stage did any of Cumis' s attorneys contact Massey's
counsel and inquire as the whereabouts of the Menchaca Affidavit.
DEFENDANTS MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO PERMIT THE TAKING
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motion for reconsideration of an order of the District Court entered on any motion filed
under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b).
Cumis's Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's February 16, 2012, order granting Massey's
Motion for Summary Judgment is untimely and without basis. The Court entered a final Judgment on
March 16, 2012. A Motion for Reconsideration had to filed by within 14 days after entry of that Judgment,
or no later than March 30, 2012. Cumis's Renewed Motion for Reconsideration was filed on April 19,
2012, which is ten days after the Court's denial of Plaintiff's initial Motion for Reconsideration. As
labeled, Plaintiff is simply renewing its aforementioned Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order
Granting Summary Judgment. Plaintiff is not asking the Court to revisit its denial of Plaintiff's Motion
for Reconsideration, dated April 9, 2012. As such, the present motion is untimely. Nevertheless, in
neither Motion for Reconsideration has Plaintiff presented new or additional facts for the Court to consider
nor have any novel legal arguments been advanced. Accordingly, the Court should deny the Plaintiff's
pending renewed Motion even if deemed timely under Rule 11 (a)(2)(B). 4
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Massey respectfully requests that this Court deny Plaintiff's Motion to
Permit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to
Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment.

4

Cumis has advanced no substantive argument that Massey has not already responded to
multiple times. To that end, Massey incorporates by reference its previous briefing, namely its
Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.
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DATED this _j_· day of May, 2012.
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC

y, Of the Firm
Attorneys for t e Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this_\_ day of May, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated below,
addressed as follows:
Jeffrey M. Wilson
WILSON & MCCOLL
420 W. Washington
PO Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-9100
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442
Attorney for Plaintiff

Fa

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

Patrick J. Collins
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC
700 17th St., Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 296-7700
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160
Attorney for Plaintiff

@

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

0
0

0
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Jeffrey M. Wilson, #1615
Wilson & McColl
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200
Boise, ID 83703
Telephone: 208-345-9100
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK

T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY

Patrick J, CoHins, #13046
Collins & Coldwell, LLC
700 Sev.;;nteenth Street, Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone'. 303-296-7700

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD nJDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
--~--------~---------.....---~-----~---~

CtJM1S fNSURANCE SOCIETY, INC. 1
Plaintiff;
vs.

Case No. CVl0-3993
WADE ~fASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
.APPRAISALS,

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS WADE MASSEY AND
CAPITOL WEST APPRAISALS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO PERMIT THE TAKING OF ERNIE MENCHACA DEPOSITION
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F) AND RENEWED MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE

COURrs ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
NOW COlvffiS Plaintiff, by and through counsel of record, a.11d files its Reply to
Defendants Vlade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to
Permit t.1e Taking of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and renewed Motion to
Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment.

1
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INTRODUCTION

I.

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Pennit Taking of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule
56(t) ar1d Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment
requesting that the Court order a continuance to permit the Plaintiff to depose Mr. Menchaca.

Plaintiff now submits its Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Penn.it Taldng
of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(t) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the
Court's Otdtr Granting Summary Judgment ("Opposition').

II.

ANALYSIS

Defendants' Opposition argues that the Plaintiff cannot apply to take Mr. Menchaca's
depositi011 because Defendants referred to the Menchaca Affidavit in their Motion for Summary
"'"'1' . "'"'v'''"

and have relied on the Menchaca Affidavit since; including the use of the Menchaca
Defendants' expert witness. Defendants seem to be claiming that it iS the Plain.tiffs

for not earlier catching Defendants' failure to file the Menchaca Affidavit with the Court or
provide a copy of the Affidavit to Plaintiffs. This argument; however, is fallacious in that it
attempts to make Plaintiff responsible for Defendants' failures and inacti.on1•

Defendants' continued use of and reliance upon the Menchaca Affidavit does not cure these
failures, rafaer it highlights them as Plaintiff has never been given the opportunity to test what
seems to be the crux of Defendants' case. Defendants' assert that they did not owe a duty to
Idahy
Sta.;1(.fard~

Credit Union (bereinafter, "Idahy FCU;;) and therefore did not violate the Uniform
of Professional Appraisal Practice (hereinafter, "USPAP"). Defendants then attempt

to make this assertion a fact by relying on the Menchaca Affidavit, which was never disclosed

nor provided, after Defendants first scheduled and then vacated Mr. Menchaca's deposition. The
Menchaca Affidavit and the affidavit of Defendants' expert, Mr. Hoffman2 , clearly raise genuine
issues of material fact by making several assertions about the scope of an appraiser's duties
1

As1.1.i'l officer eif the Court, Defendunts' co11nsel has an affirmative duty to disclose all documentation Defendant
intends. to rely on at triaL
'-Defendants adi"l'lit that Mr. Hoffman relied on Mr. Merichaca's Affidavit when formulating his expert opinion. See,
DefrmdMt's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Pennit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule
56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Coun's Order Granting Summary Judgment, p, 4.

2
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u.rider USPAP that are not supported by the Financial Institution Refonn and Recovery Act of
1989 (hereinafter; "FIR.REA"), the plain language ofUSPAP Standard 2-2(b) or Defendant
Massey's certification of the scope

of Defendants' Appraisal of Real Property.

In Defendant

certification of Defendants' Appraisal of Real Property; Defendant Massey certifies

A.ppr-a:isal is a ''Summary,, appraisal which is governed by USPAP Standard2-2(b). As
discusst'.d in Plaintiffs Reply to Defendants> Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

JuJgment, USPAP Standard 2-2(b) requires an appraiser to state the identity of an intended user
by name or type (emphasis added). After certifying the Appraisal of Real Property as a
Summary appraisal, Defendants' state in paragraph 23 of the Appraisal that, ..(t]he borrower [or]

another lender at the request ofthe borrower..•may rely on this appraisal reporf 1 (emphasis
added),
language of I.R.C.P. 56(f) states that the Court may order a continuance to permit the

of a deposition when "it appear[s] from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion [for

surnmary judgment] that the party cannot for the reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the party's opposition".

In its Order granting Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment and its Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, the Court notes that
it raised ihe specific issue of Defendants' failure to file the Menchaca Affidavit. In response,

Plaintiff

:filed two affidavits of counsel stating that they never received the Menchaca
Even if Defendants have subsequently filed the Menchaca Affidavit with the Court,

'""'-'-'""...'"' h~we never had a chance to question the factual assertions made in the Menchaca

Affidavit and in turn have never been able question the legal assertions made by Defendants'
expert in bis affidavit. Accordingly. Plaintiff filed its Motion to Pennit Taldng of Ernie
Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's
Order Gi:anting Summary Judgment.

3

See Affidavit of Patrick Collins and Affidavit of Jeffeiy Wilson, which state that neither counsel for Plaintiff ever
received Mr. Menchaca's Affidavit.
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day of May, 2012.

Respectfully submitted>
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC

WILSON & MCCOLL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The ~dersigned hereby certifies that true and correct copies of the foregoing have been
rhisC:/- day of May, 2012, on the following: .

"

Michael E. Kelly, Esq.
jO!m "·T nrower, Esq.
Lopez and Kelly, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Ste. I 00
P.O. Box 856
Boise, ID 83701Y08¥ •
~
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MAY 2 i 2012

Jeffrey M. Wilson, # 1615
Wilson & McColl
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200
Boise, ID 83703
Telephone: 208-345-9100

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
. K CANO, DEPUTY

Patrick J. Collins, #13046
Collins & Coldwell, LLC
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: 303-296-7700
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,

lO~ ?>0Ci~G
Case No.
NOTICE OF APPEAL

LY

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants-Res ondents.

NOTICE OF APPEAL
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, WADE MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS, AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEYS, LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC, P.O. BOX
856, BOISE ID 38703 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named appellant, CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC. (hereinafter,

"CUMIS") appeals against the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the
Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on the 17th day of
February, 2012, the Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on the 16th day of March,

1

31.0

2012 and the Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, entered in the above entitled action
on the 10th day of April, 2012; Honorable Judge Kerrick presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the judgment

and orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11

I.A.R.
3.

Appellant CUMIS intends to assert in the appeal that Respondents were

incorrectly granted their Motion for Summary Judgment and that Appellant was incorrectly
denied its Motion for Summary Judgment and its Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's
Order granting Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
4.

Appellant requests preparation of the reporter's transcript as defined by Rule 25,

I.A.R. in hard copy.
5.

Appellant requests that all pleadings, affidavits, exhibits and documents filed with

the district court be included in the appellate record.

I certify:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Kathy Klemetson, 1115 Caldwell, ID 83605.
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of
the reporter's transcript.
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule

20, I.A.R.

2

00031.1.

DATED this 21st day of May, 2012.

WILSON & MCCOLL

DATED this 21st day of May, 2012.
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC.

3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE
OF APPEAL has been transmitted via U.S.P.S, postage pre-paid, and fax service this 21st day
of May, 2012, to the following:
Michael E. Kelly
John J. Browder
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
P.O. Box 856
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 342-4344

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE
OF APPEAL has been transmitted via U.S.P.S, postage pre-paid, this 21st day of May, 2012, to
the following:
Court Reporter
Kathy Klemetson
1115 Caldwell, ID 83605.
·1
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JeffreyM. Wtlson; #1615
Christopher R. Moore, #8772
Wilson & McColl
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200 ·
Boise, ID 83703
Telephone: 208-345-9100

Patrick J. Collins, #13046
Collins & Coldwell, LLC
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820
Denver; CO 80202
Telephone: 303-296-7700
Attorneys for Plaintiff7Appellant
1N TIIB DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF

IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
CUMIS INSURA.~CE SOCIETY, INC')
PJajntiff/Appellant,

Case No. CV 2010 3993C
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants/Res ondents.

~-.-~-~----0---------'-------------~

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
TO: TIIB ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS" WADE MASSEY AND. CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS. AND THE PARTIES1 ATTORNEYS, LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC, AND THE
CLERK OF TIIB ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

Tne above named Appellant,, CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., appeals

against the above named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order on Motions
for Summary Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on the 17th day of February, 2012,

1
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the Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on the 16th day of March, 2012, the Order on
PlaLntiffs Motion for Reconsideration, entered in the above entitled action on the l 0th day of
Aprili 2012; and the Court's Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Permit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca·

Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(£) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order

Granting Summary Judgment, entered by the Court on May 10, 2012; Honorable Judge Kerrick
presiding.
· 2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals and the

judgm.ent described in paragraph I above is an a.ppealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11

lAR.
3.

Appellant intends to assert in the appeal th.at Respondents were incorrectly

granted their Motion for Summary Judgment and that Appellant was incorrectly denied its

Motion for Summary Judgment and its Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Febru.azy 16,
2012 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff's Motion to Penn.it the Talcing of
Ernie Menchaca. Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(£) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the
Court;s Order Granting Summary Judgment.

4.

No Order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the Record.

5.

(a)

A reporter's transcript is requested.

(b)

The Appellant requests preparation of the following portions of the

reporter~s

I.

transcript in hard copy and electronic format:

Hearing upon Plaintiff's Motion for Swnmazy Judgment and ·

3
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~.

Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Sununary Judgment held May 10,
2012.
6.

(a)

The Appellant's request the following doci.J.ments be included in the

Clerk's record in addition to the autoi;iiatically included under I.A.R. 28:
1.

All Pleadings/Affidavits/Exhibits with respect to Appellant's and

Respondent's Motions for Summary Judgment heard on February 9,
2012;
2.

All Pleadings/Affidavits/Exhibits with respect to Appellant's

Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's February 16, 2012 Order on

· Motions for Summary Judgment, and Respondent's response to the same;
all.d

3.

All Pleadings/Affidavits/Exhibits with respect to Appellant's

Motion to Pennit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to
Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order Granting
Summa..ry- Judgment, and Respondent's response to the same heard on
May 10, 2012,
I certify:

(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Kathy Klemetson, 1115 Albany, Caldwell, Idaho 83605.
Laura Whiting, 1115 Albany, Caldwell, Idaho 83605
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of

the re-porter:1s transcript.

3
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(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

(d) That the. appellate filing fee has been paid.
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule
20, I.A.R.
DATED this

/.f; day of June, 2012.

DATED this / {offtday of June, 2012.

COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC

WILSON & McCOLL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J ~day

I HEREi3Y CERTIFY that on the
of June, 2012, I mailed and faxed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL by regular United States mail
with t11e correct postage affixed thereon addressed to:
Canyon County Courthouse

Kathy Klemetson
1115 Albany
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Facsimile: 208-454-7442
Canyon County Courthouse
Laura Whiting
1115 Albany
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Facsimile: 208-454-7442

John J. Browder
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
· Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile: 208-342-4344

Patrick J. Collins
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC
700 Seventeenth Street; Suite 1820
Denver, Colorado 80202
Facsimile: 303-295-7160
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.

Michael E. Kelly, ISB #4351
John J. Browder, ISB #7531
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, ID 83701-0856
Telephone: (208) 342-4300
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344
2700.024\Supp.Judgment.wpd

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CVlO - 3993

SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT

vs.
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Judgment, entered on
March 16, 2012 is hereby amended, such that Defendants WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS shall recover against the Plaintiffs, costs as a matter of right totaling $817.61
pursuant to the Order of the Court at the hearing on May 10, 2012.
DATED

~;')--P--------

th~day

of June, 2012.

SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT- I

31.9

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this cl\ day of June, 2012, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method indicated
below, addressed as follows:

~

Michael E. Kelly
John J. Browder
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-4300
Facsimile: (208) 342-4344

0
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D

60

Jeffrey M. Wilson
WILSON & MCCOLL
420 W. Washington
PO Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-9100
Facsimile: (208) 384-0442
Attorney for Plaintiff

0
D

~

Patrick J. Collins
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC
700 17th St., Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 296-7700
Facsimile: (303) 295-7160
Attorney for Plaintiff

0
D
D

~

----·

Clerk of the Court

SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT-2
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U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

U.S. Mail
Hand-Delivered
Overnight mail
Facsimile

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
AND FEES

CV-2010-3993-C

On February 17, 2012, this court entered its Order on Motions for Summary Judgment in
this case, granting Defendants summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims against them.
Judgment on the court's February 17, 2012 Order was entered on March 16, 2012.
On March 22, 2012, Defendants filed their Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees seeking
$817.61 costs as a matter of right and $28,545.00 in attorney fees, pursuant to Idaho Code
section 12-120(3), through February 29, 2012.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND FEES
- 1-

321.

Plaintiff filed its Response to Defendants' Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees, together
with a Notice of Hearing, on April 4, 2012.
I. Prevailing Party

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l), in order to recover costs and attorney fees in this action,
Defendants must establish that they are the prevailing party.
A trial court's determination regarding whether a party prevailed in an action is a matter
of discretion. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B); Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 210 P.3d 552, 555 (2009).
In making a determination, the court properly exercises its discretion if it: (1) correctly
perceives the issue as one of discretion; (2) acts within the outer boundaries of that discretion
and consistently with the applicable legal standards; and (3) reaches its determination by an
exercise of reason. Id.
Plaintiff apparently contends that Defendants are not the prevailing party in this action
because: "I. The Court's Order Makes Factual Findings that are in Dispute or Not Supported by
the Evidence." The court finds that this not a proper ground to object to an award of costs and
fees and the matter has already been addressed in the court's Order on Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration. In light of the court's determination in the February 17, 2012 Order on
Motions for Summary Judgment, the court determines that Defendants are the prevailing party
in this action.
II. Costs

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND FEES
-2-
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Defendants seek an award of costs as a matter of right, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l )(C)
in the amount of $817 .61. 1
Plaintiff has not specifically challenged the amount or Defendants' entitlement to such
amount, other than the continued assertion that the court erred in its determination on summary
judgment. Accordingly, the court determines that Defendants are entitled to an award of costs
in the amount of $817 .61.
III. Attorney Fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3)
Defendants seek $28,545.00 in attorney fees through February 29, 2012, including
paralegal fees, pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3).
A. Statutory Authority for an Award of Attorney Fees
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) authorizes the court, in any civil action, to award reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party when provided for by any statute or contract. Idaho Code Section
12-120(3) requires the court to allow a reasonable attorney fee to the prevailing party in a civil
action based upon a commercial transaction, unless otherwise provided by law. The term
"commercial transaction" is defined in the statute as "all transactions except transactions for
personal or household purposes."
The issue of whether an action is based on commercial transaction, for purposes of an
award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3), is a question oflaw. Great

Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 470 (2001).

1

In their original papers, Defendants requested an award of costs in the amount of$875.72 and the court used this
figure in making its determination on the record on May 10, 2012. However, Defendants subsequently submitted a
Supplemental Judgment reflecting costs in the amount of $817 .61. The court has used that figure in this Order in
order to avoid any discrepancy between this Order and the Supplemental Judgment.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF
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In determining whether a prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees
pursuant to section 12-120(3 ), the court must engage in a two-stage analysis: (1) there must be
a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim; and (2) the commercial transaction must
be the basis upon which recovery is sought. Id. at 471.
1. Commercial Transaction Integral to the Claim

In determining whether there is a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim, the
critical test is whether the commercial transaction constitutes the gravamen of the lawsuit. Id.
The commercial transaction must be an actual basis of the complaint, that is, the lawsuit and the
causes of action must be based on a commercial transaction, not simply a situation that can be
characterized as a commercial transaction. Id.
The issue is whether there was a transaction between the parties to which section 12120(3) would properly apply. Id. at 472. Section 12-120(3) "cannot be invoked ifthe
commercial transaction is between parties only indirectly related, i.e. there was no transaction
between the parties." Id. (citing Hausum v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569 (Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis

in original).
Defendar.ts rely on a line of cases, including Miller v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical
Ctr., Inc., which stand for the proposition that "if a party asserts a claim that is based upon the

existence of an alleged commercial transaction, attorney fees are awardable to a prevailing party
who defends against such claim even if the alleged commercial transaction is found not to have
existed. In that circumstance, attorney fees are awardable under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) even if

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND FEES
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there were other theories also asserted in support of the claim that would not have triggered
application of the statute." 139 Idaho 825, 839 (2004) (citing Great Plains).
However, Miller is distinguishable from the instant case in that the plaintiff in that case
apparently actually alleged facts sufficient to establish, prima facie, a transaction between
himself and the defendant:
In his second amended complaint, Dr. Miller alleged as one count that his application for
medical staff privileges created a contract between him and the Hospital and that the Hospital
breached that contract. The focus of the trial was whether the Hospital acted in good faith in the
performance of its alleged contractual allegations. Id The court determined that "Dr. Miller's
allegation of a contract between him and the Hospital that was for other than personal or
household purposes constituted the allegation of a commercial transaction. Id. The Court
reiterated, however, "that a transaction cannot exist under the statute unless the parties dealt
with each other directly." Id
Here, while Plaintiff did assert a claim for breach of contract, that claim was not based
on a transaction in which the parties dealt with one another directly. Instead, as Defendants
asserted on their Motion for Summary Judgment and the court determined in its Order on
Motions for Summary Judgment, the allegations of the complaint made out a claim for
negligence only, as a matter oflaw.
IV. Attorney Fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121

On May 1, 2012, Defendants filed a Reply and Reply Affidavit adding a claim for an
award of fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF
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The court finds that Defendants' request for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho
Code section 12-121 is not properly before it for two reasons. First, the applicable provisions of
the I.R.C.P. do not provide for a reply in response to an objection to costs and fees. See I.R.C.P.
54(d)(5), 54(d)(6), and 54(e)(l). Second, pursuant to Rule 54(d)(5), a memorandum of costs
must be filed within fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment and "[F]ailure to file such
memorandum of costs within the period prescribed by this rule shall be a waiver of the right of
costs." In light ofthis requirement, the court finds that Defendants waived their right to a claim
for attorney fees pursuant to section 12-121 by failing to file their memorandum requesting an
award of fees under section 12-121 within fourteen (14) days after the entry of the Judgment.
However, as the court noted at the hearing on Plaintiff's objection, it does not find an
award of fees pursuant section 12-121 appropriate on the facts of this case.
I.R.C.P. 54( e)(1) authorizes the court, in any civil action, to award reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party when provided for by any statute or contract.
Idaho Code Section 12-121 authorizes the court, in any civil action, to award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party. However, pursuant to IRCP 54(e )(1 ), the court may award
attorney fees against a defendant under Section 12-121 only when it finds, from the facts
presented to it, that the case was defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
Therefore, an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 is not a matter of
right. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District v. Washington Federal Savings, 135 Idaho 518,
524, 20 P.3d 702, 708 (2001). Instead, an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 12-121 is
within the discretion of the trial court, but only when the court "is left with the abiding belief

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF
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that the action was ... defended ... frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Id. If
there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, the court may not award attorney fees under section
12-121, even if the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation. Id. 135 Idaho at 524-525, 20 P.3d at 708-709. A claim is
not necessarily frivolous simply because the district court concludes it fails as a matter of law.
Garner, 259 P.3d at 614. A misperception of the law or of one's interest under the law is not,

by itself, unreasonable. Id. (quoting Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262, 265
(Ct. App. 1997)). Rather, the question is whether the position adopted was not only incorrect,
but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation." Id.
While the court dismissed Plaintiffs breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation
claims as improper under Idaho law, the court finds that such claims were merely alternative
means of alleging that Defendants violated a duty to Plaintiff on the facts alleged. The court
subsequently granted summary judgment to Defendants dismissing Plaintiffs negligence claim
based upon insufficient evidence, in the record before the court, to support the existence of a
duty, recognized by law, running from Defendants to Plaintiff. The court cannot conclude that
Plaintiffs position, that Defendants had a legal duty to Plaintiff, was so plainly fallacious that it
could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
ORDER
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Based on the foregoing, Defendants are awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount
of $817.61; and Plaintiff's objection to Defendants' Motion for an award of attorney fees is
GRANTED, and Defendants' request for an award of attorney fees is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

-!<----

Dated this~ day of June, 2012.

~-(!,~'~
Juneal C. Kerrick
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the
following, either by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid; by personal service; by courthouse
basket; or by facsimile copy:

John J. Browder
Lopez & Kelly, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
P.O. Box 856
Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile: 208-342-4344
Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200
Boise, Idaho 83 703
Facsimile: 208-384-0442
Patrick J. Collins
Collins & Coldwell, LLC
700 17th Street, Suite 1820
Denver, Colorado 80202
Facsimile: 303-295-7160

Dated this

A\

day of June, 2012.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO
Clerk of the Court

By:~
Deputy Clerk

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND FEES
-9-

329

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
CV-2010-3993-C

INTRODUCTION
In this action, Plaintiff asserts claims for professional negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, and breach of contract based upon Defendant's alleged negligence in
preparing an appraisal on certain real property located in Canyon County. Plaintiff alleges that
Idahy Federal Credit Union, now known as Icon Credit Union, relied on the appraisal in
approving a loan to Steven and Valerie Hruza secured by a second mortgage on the property.
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The factual allegations of the Complaint are set forth in the court's February 17, 2012
Order on Motions for Summary Judgment. In that Order, the court granted Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims for Negligent Misrepresentation and
Breach of Contract, based on the determination that such claims were not viable, as a matter of
law, based upon existing Idaho precedent and the facts alleged, and Plaintiffs Negligence
claim, based upon the absence of a duty, recognized by law, running from Defendants to
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 1, 2012.
On April 10, 2012, the court entered its Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration,
determining that it did not require oral argument on the Motion and adhering to its
determination in the February 17, 2012 Order.
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

On April 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed its "Motion to Permit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca
Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(£) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order
Granting Summary Judgment" requesting "that the Court stay the Judgment in this case, permit
the deposition of Ernie Menchaca, and reconsider and vacate its Order granting Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment and allow this Plaintiff to proceed to trial, allowing a jury to
determine whether Massey is liable for his admittedly 'defective' Appraisal."

I. Legal Standards
There is no provision in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to "renew" a motion for
reconsideration that has already been determined on the merits.
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Pursuant to IRCP 11 (a)(2)(B), a "motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders
of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than
fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment." Judgment on the court's February 17,
2012 Order was entered on March 16, 2012. Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on April 19,
2012, more than fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment. Accordingly, to the extent
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the court's February 17, 2012 Order on this Motion, the
motion is not timely. The record before the court on the instant motion indicates that it is
addressed to the court's February 17, 2012 Order, for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff seeks
relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(£), which would be available only in relation to Defendants'
original Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) Plaintiff seeks to "renew" its Motion for
Reconsideration, which was addressed to the court's February 17 Order; (3) Plaintiff contends,
on this Motion, that the court erred in granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; and
(4) in its April 10, 2012 Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, the court merely
adhered to its determination in the February 17, 2012 Order - Plaintiff did not rely on any
additional facts in support of its Motion for Reconsideration and did not adduce any new or
different legal authority in support of its Motion for Reconsideration.

II. I.R.C.P. 56(f) Relief
Plaintiff also seeks an order permitting Plaintiff to take "the deposition of Ernie
Menchaca pursuant to Rule 56(f)."
I.R.C.P. 56(f) authorizes the court to "refuse the application for judgment or order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
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had" where it appears "from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition."
Rule 56(f) does not authorize a motion to be made after summary judgment has been
granted and Plaintiff has adduced no authority for the proposition that a Rule 56(f) motion is
properly interposed after an order has been entered on a motion for summary judgment.
In addition, the affidavits adduced in support of the instant motion do not state facts
sufficient for the court to conclude that Plaintiff "cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit
facts essential to justify" its opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Finally, and most troubling to the court, the affidavits filed by Plaintiff in support of the
instant Motion are inherently contradictory. The Affidavit of Plaintiff's local counsel
acknowledges that counsel agreed to the court's consideration of the Menchaca Affidavit in
determining the parties' motions for summary judgment, stating that such agreement was based
on a mistaken belief that Plaintiff had, in fact, received a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit prior
to the hearing. However, at the same time, in Paragraph Five of the instant Motion, Plaintiff
states, "[T]he Court's Order is incorrect in the statement that counsel at the hearing
"acknowledge receipt of the Menchaca Affidavit." In addition, the Affidavit of Plaintiff's pro
hac vice counsel in support of the instant Motion states, in Paragraph Six, "[P]laintiff s counsel

disagrees with the Court's assertion in its Order granting Defendant's request for summary
judgment which stated, 'At the hearing, the Court confirmed that Plaintiff had timely received a
copy of the Menchaca Affidavit with the original Motion papers .... "i In light of this
contradiction in Plaintiff's own evidence, there is no basis for the court to conclude that
1

Counsel has not adduced a transcript of the hearing, or other evidence, in support of this contention.
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Plaintiff, at the time of the original Motion for Consideration, could not present facts essential to
justify Plaintiffs opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
On their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants asserted that they assumed no duty
to Plaintiff (Idahy) in preparing the appraisal at issue. The record contains the following
evidence: (1) In its deposition, Plaintiff stated it did not know how it came into possession of
the appraisal; and (2) Mr. Menchaca stated that industry custom requires an assignment when a
second lender wishes to use an appraisal commissioned by a prior lender and Clearwater
Mortgage did not assign the appraisal to Idahy. Plaintiff has not explained, in its papers on the
instant Motion, why it cannot or could not present facts contradicting this evidence.

III. Conclusion
In concluding that Plaintiff has not demonstrated entitlement to relief on this motion, the
court is not determining that Plaintiff has no procedural basis for relief in this action. The court
is also cognizant of the well-established policy in the courts of this state that actions should
proceed on the merits rather than being resolved on a technicality. See Hayward v. Valley Vista

Care Corporation, 136 Idaho 342, 349, 33 P.3d 816, 823 (2001). The court has simply
determined that the instant Motion to Renew and for relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(f) is not a
proper vehicle, even under a liberal construction of the rules. The court notes that Plaintiff has
not sought relief from the Judgment entered in this case or from the court's February 17, 2012
Order pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b) and, therefore, the court has not had occasion to make a
determination under that Rule or any other applicable rule of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion to Permit the Taking of Ernie Menchaca
Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order
Granting Summary Judgment are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

PDated thi00 day of June, 2012.

./1--;:~_J-~ ~·~~
/

~l C. Kerrick
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the
following, either by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid; by personal service; by courthouse
basket; or by facsimile copy:

John J. Browder
Lopez & Kelly, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
P.O. Box 856
Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile: 208-342-4344
Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200
Boise, Idaho 83 703
Facsimile: 208-384-0442
Patrick J. Collins
Collins & Coldwell, LLC
700 17th Street, Suite 1820
Denver, Colorado 80202
Facsimile: 303-295-7160

Dated this __o_c_l__ day of June, 2012.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO
Clerk of the Court

By:~
--+-------------Deputy Clerk
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_F_~A.k ;;:/§Q 9.M.
Jeffrey M. Wilson, #1615
Christopher R. Moore, #8772
Wilson & McColl
3858 N. Garden Center Way, Suite 200
Boise, ID 83703
Telephone: 208-345-9100

JUL 12 2012
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY

Patrick J. Collins, #13046
Collins & Coldwellj LLC
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: 303-296-7700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY OF TIIE STATE OF IDAHO
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. CV 2010 3993C
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.

WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants/Res ondents.

SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
TO: TIIE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, WADE MASSEY AND CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS 1 AND THE PARTIES' AITORNEYS, LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC, AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: .
NOTICE rs HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

Th~ :tbove named

Appellant) CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.> appeals

against the above named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order on Motions
fo:t Swn.rnary Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on the 17th day of February, 2012,

l
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the Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on the 16th day of March, 2012, the Order on
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, entered in the above entitled action on the 10th day of

April; 2012, the Court's Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Pennit the Talcing of Ernie Menchaca
Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order
Granting Summary Judgment, entered orally by the Court on May 10, 2012; and the Order on
Plaintiff's Second Motion for Reconsideration, entered by the Court on June 21. 2012;
Honorable Judge Kerrick presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals and the

judgment described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11

I.AR.
3.

Appellant intends to assert in the appeal that Respondents were incorrectly

granted their Motion for Summai-y Judgment and that Appellant was incorrectly denied its
Motion for Summary Judgment and its Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's February 16,
2012 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment~ and Plaintiffs Motion to Permit the Taking of
Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(t) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the
Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment.

4.

No Order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the Record.

5.

(a)

A reporter's transcript is requested.

(b)

The Appellant requests preparation of the following portions of the

reporter's transcript in hard copy and electronic format:
1.

Hearing upon Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and

Defendanfs Motion for Summary Judgment held February 9, 2012; and

2
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Hearing upon Plaintiffs Motion to Pennit the Taking of Ernie

Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to
Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment held May 10,
2012.
6.

(a)

The Appellant's request the following documents be included in the

Clerk's record in addition to the automatically included under I.A.R. 28:
l.

All Pleadings/Affidavits/Exhibits with respect to Appellant's and

Respondent's Motions for Summary Judgment heard on February 9, 2012;
2.

All Pleadings/Affidavits/Exhibits with respect to Appellant's

Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's February 16, 2012 Order on
Motions for Summary Judgment, and Respondenf s response to the same;
and

3.

All Pleadings/Affidavits/Exhibits with respect to Appellant's

Motion to Pennit the Tal<lng of Ernie Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to
Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order Granting
Summary Judgment, and Respondent's response to the same heard on
May 10, 2012.
4.

The Court's Order on Motion for Summary Judgment entered

Februarv 17. '.'-01?..
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I certify:

(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Kathy Klemetson; 1115 Albany, Caldwell, Idaho 83605.
Laura Whiting, 1115 Albany, Caldwell, Idaho 83605
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of

the reporter's transcript.
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule

20, I.A.R.

DATED this

_j/__ day of July, 2012.

DATED this

WILSON & McCOLL

_&..a.ay of July, 2012.

COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /b day of July, 2012, I mailed and faxed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDEDNoTICE OF APPEAL by regular United States mail
with the correct postage affixed thereon addressed to:
·
Canyon County Courthouse
Kathy Klemetson

1115 Albany
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Facsimile: 208-454-7442
Canyon County Courthouse

Laura Whiting
I 115 Albany
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

Facsimile: 208454-7442
John J. Browder
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street, Suite 100
PO Box 856
Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile: 208-342-4344

Patrick J. Collins
COLLINS & COLDWELL, LLC
700 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1820
Denver, Colorado 80202
Facsimile: 303-295-7160
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,

)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsWADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants-Respondents,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-10-03993*C
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following
is being sent as an exhibit:

NONE

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
~ii""'-'"~i the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsWADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-10-03993*C
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my
direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including documents requested.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of

CHRISYAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
m
the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.,

)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)

Supreme Court No.

40002-2012

)

-vs-

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)

WADE MASSEY and CAPITOL WEST
APPRAISALS,

)
)
)

Defendants-Respondents.

)

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of record to each
party as follows:
Jeffrey M. Wilson and Christopher R. Moore
Michael E. Kelly and John J. Browder

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy
U.HYL.c'-"' ...
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